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Programming digital contracts comes with unique challenges, which include (i) expressing and enforcing
protocols of interaction, (ii) controlling resource usage, and (iii) preventing the duplication or deletion of a
contract’s assets. This article presents the design and type-theoretic foundation of Nomos, a programming
language for digital contracts that addresses these challenges. To express and enforce protocols, Nomos is
based on shared binary session types. To control resource usage, Nomos employs automatic amortized resource
analysis. To prevent the duplication or deletion of assets, Nomos uses a linear type system. A monad inte-
grates the effectful session-typed language with a general-purpose functional language. Nomos’ prototype
implementation features linear-time type checking and efficient type reconstruction that includes automatic
inference of resource bounds via off-the-shelf linear optimization. The effectiveness of the language is evaluated
with case studies about implementing common smart contracts such as auctions, elections, and currencies.
Nomos is completely formalized, including the type system, a cost semantics, and a transactional semantics to
instantiate Nomos contracts on a blockchain. The type soundness proof ensures that protocols are followed
at run-time and that types establish sound upper bounds on the resource consumption, ruling out re-entrancy
and out-of-gas vulnerabilities, respectively.
1 INTRODUCTION
Digital contracts are programs that implement the execution of a contract.With the rise of blockchains
and cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [Nakamoto 2008], Ethereum [Wood 2014], and Tezos [Goodman
2014], digital contracts have become popular in the form of smart contracts, which provide poten-
tially distrusting parties with programmablemoney and a distributed consensusmechanism. Smart
contracts are used to implement auctions [Auc 2016], investment instruments [Siegel 2016], insur-
ance agreements [Initiative 2008], supply chainmanagement [Law2017], andmortgage loans [Morabito
2017]. They hold the promise to lower cost, increase fairness, and expand access to the financial
infrastructure. However, like all software, smart contracts can contain bugs and security vulnera-
bilities [Atzei et al. 2017], which have direct financial consequences. A well-known example is the
attack on The DAO [Siegel 2016], resulting in a $60 million dollar theft by exploiting a contract
vulnerability.
Today’s contract languages are typically derived from existing general-purpose languages like
JavaScript (Ethereum’s Solidity [Auc 2016]), Go (Hyperledger project [Cachin 2016]), or OCaml
(Tezos’ Liquidity [Liq 2018]), which fail to accommodate the domain-specific requirements of dig-
ital contracts. These requirements are: (i) expressing and enforcing protocols of interaction, (ii)
controlling resource (or gas) usage, and (iii) preventing duplication or discard of a contract’s as-
sets.
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In this article, we present the type-theoretic foundation of Nomos, a programming language for
digital contracts that accommodates the aforementioned requirements by construction.
To express and enforce the protocols underlying a contract, Nomos is based on session types
[Honda 1993; Honda et al. 1998, 2008], in particular on the works rooted in the Curry-Howard
correspondence between linear logic and the session-typed process calculus [Caires and Pfenning
2010; Pfenning and Griffith 2015; Toninho et al. 2013; Wadler 2012]. Session types capture proto-
cols of interactions in the type, and type-checking statically guarantees adherence to those pro-
tocols at run-time. Session types make the core functionality of a contract and its intended inter-
actions with various parties explicit, rather than buried in implementation code. Delimiting the
sequences of actions that must be executed atomically, session types moreover prevent intercep-
tion of a contract in an inconsistent state, as is possible through re-entrancy in some contract
languages.
To control resource usage, Nomos employs and further develops automatic amortized resource
analysis (AARA), a type-based technique for automatically inferring symbolic resource bounds [Carbonneaux et al.
2017; Hoffmann et al. 2011, 2017; Hofmann and Jost 2003; Jost et al. 2010]. AARA is parametric in
the cost model, making it directly applicable to track gas cost of Nomos contracts. A unique feature
of Nomos’ resource-aware type system is that it allows contracts to store gas in internal data struc-
tures to amortize the cost of resource intensive transactions. Failure to support estimation of gas
usage bares the risk of high losses in case transactions fail due to dynamic out-of-gas exceptions
and makes contracts vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks.
To prevent duplication or deletion of assets, Nomos uses linearity [Girard 1987], which naturally
arises from the Curry-Howard correspondence established between linear logic and the session-
typed process calculus [Caires and Pfenning 2010; Pfenning and Griffith 2015; Wadler 2012]. Acci-
dental or malicious duplication and deletion is a source of major concern in today’s contract lan-
guages [Meredith 2015]. To support the writing of general-purpose programs, Nomos moreover
complements the session-typed language with a functional language, using a contextual monad to
shield expressions from effectful processes.
We formalize Nomos by giving its type system and operational semantics and by proving type
safety. Integrating the seemingly disparate approaches (session types, resource analysis, linearity,
and functional programming) and combining them with the different roles that arise in a dig-
ital contract (contract, asset, transaction) in a way that the result remains consistent, presents
unique challenges. For one, both the functional as well as session-typed language use potential
annotations to predict the resource consumption, which requires care when functional values are
exchanged as messages between processes. For another, prior work on integrating shared and lin-
ear session types [Balzer and Pfenning 2017] preclude contracts from persisting their linear assets
across transactions, a feature essential to digital contract development; a restriction that we lift
in this work. Fundamental is the use of different forms of typing judgments for expressions and
processes along with judgmental modes to distinguish the different roles in a digital contract. The
modes are essential in ensuring type safety, as they allow the expression of mode-indexed invari-
ants on the typing contexts and their enforcement by the typing rules.
A challenge in Nomos’ design was the sound integration of session types, resource analysis,
linearity, and functional programming so that type checking is linear in the size of the program
and resource bounds can efficiently inferred with an off-the-shelf LP solver. Efficient type checking
is particularly important if type-checking is part of contract validation and can be used for denial-
of-service attacks.
To evaluate Nomos, we implemented a publicly available open-source prototype [Nom 2019]
and conducted 8 case studies implementing common smart contracts such as auctions, elections,
and currencies. Our experiments show that type-checking overhead is less than 0.7 ms for each
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contract and bound inference (needed once at deployment) takes less than 10 ms. Moreover, gas
bounds are tight for most contracts.
Our contributions are:
• design of Nomos, a language that addresses the domain-specific requirements of digital con-
tracts by construction;
• a fine-tuned system of typing judgments (Section 4) that usesmodes to orchestrate the sound
integration of session types (Section 3), functions (Section 5), and resource analysis (Sec-
tion 6);
• extension of shared session types to support linear assets;
• resource cost amortization by allowing gas storage in internal data structures (Section 6);
• type safety proof of Nomos using a novel asynchronous cost semantics (Section 7);
• a prototype implementation and case study of prominent blockchain applications (Section 8);
• a transactional semantics to instantiate Nomos contracts and transactions on a blockchain
(Section 9).
In addition, Section 2 provides an overview of Nomos’ main features based on an example. Sec-
tion 9 discusses known limitations. Section 10 reviews related work, and Section 11 concludes this
article with future directions. The appendix formalizes the complete language with typing rules,
cost semantics, and the type safety theorem and proof. It also shows the implementation of all the
smart contract applications used in the main paper.
2 NOMOS BY EXAMPLE
This section introduces the main features of Nomos using a simple auction contract as an example.
The subsequent sections explain each feature in technical detail.
Explicit Protocols of Interaction. Digital contracts, like traditional contracts, follow a prede-
fined protocol. For instance, an auction contract follows the protocol of a bidding phase where bid-
ders submit their bids to the auctioneer (possibly multiple times), followed by a collection phase
where the highest bidder receives the lot while all other bidders receive their bids back. In exist-
ing smart contract languages, like Solidity [Auc 2016], the bidding part of the auction is typically
implemented using the bid function below. This function receives a bid (msg.value) from a bidder
(msg.sender) and adds it to their total previous bids, stored in the bidValue hash map.
function bid() public payable {
bidder = msg.sender; bid = msg.value;
bidValue[bidder] = bidValue[bidder] + bid; }
The above code does not guarantee that a bid can only be placed in the bidding phase. To enforce
this constraint, we can introduce a state variable, such as status, to track the different phases of a
contract. Using this variable we can guard the above code block with the precondition
require (status == running)
checking whether the auction is still running and thus accepts bids. The precondition is checked
at run-time, aborting the execution if the condition is not met. It is the responsibility of the pro-
grammer to define state variables, update them, and corresponding guard functions.
Rather than burying the contract’s interaction protocol in implementation code using state vari-
ables and run-time checks, in Nomos, protocols can be expressed explicitly using a session type.
Type-checking then makes sure that the program implements the protocol defined by the session
type. The auction’s protocol amounts to the below session type:
auction = ↑S
L
⊳22 ⊕ {running : N{bid : id → money⊸ ↓S
L
auction, % recv bid from client
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cancel : ⊲21↓SLauction}, % client canceled
ended : N{collect : id → ⊕{won : lot ⊗ ↓SLauction, % client won
lost : money ⊗ ⊲7↓S
L
auction}, % client lost
cancel : ⊲21↓S
L
auction}} % client canceled
We first focus on how the session type defines the main interactions of a contract with a bidder,
ignoring the operators ↑SL, ↓
S
L, ⊳, and ⊲ for now. To distinguish the main two states an auction can
be in, the session type uses the internal choice type constructor (⊕), leading the contract to either
send the label running or ended, depending on whether the auction still accepts bids or not. Dual
to an internal choice is an external choice (N), which leaves the choice to the client (i.e., bidder)
rather than the provider (i.e., contract). For example, in case the auction is still running, the client
can choose between placing a bid (label bid) or backing out (cancel). If the client chooses to place
a bid, they have to indicate their identifier (type id), followed by a payment (typemoney). Nomos
session types allow transfer of both non-linear values that can be duplicated or discarded (e.g. id),
using the arrow (→) constructor, and linear assets, using the linear implication (⊸) constructor.
Using a linear type to represent digital money (money) makes sure that such a value can neither be
duplicated nor lost. Should the auction have ended, the client can choose to check their outcome
(label collect) or back out (cancel). In the case of collect, the auction will answer with either won
or lost. In the former case, the auction will send the lot (commodity being auctioned, represented
as a linear type), in the latter case, it will return the client’s bid. The linear product (⊗) constructor
is dual to⊸ and denotes the transfer of a linear value from the contract to the client. The auction
type guarantees that a client cannot collect during the running phase, while they cannot bid during
the ended phase.
Our discussion so far describes the interaction of one client with the auction, prescribing the
sequences of steps to be taken according to the protocol defined by the session type. In reality, how-
ever, an auction will have several clients. Nomos uses a shared session type [Balzer and Pfenning
2017] to guarantee that bidders interact with the auction in mutual exclusion from each other and
that the sequences of actions are executed atomically. To demarcate the parts of the protocol that
become a critical section, the above session type uses the ↑S
L
and ↓S
L
type modalities. The ↑S
L
modality
denotes the beginning of a critical section, the ↓SL modality denotes its end. Programmatically, ↑
S
L
translates into an acquire of the auction session and ↓S
L
into the release of the session. As indicated
by the auction session type, acquire and release tend to be the begin and end points of a session,
framing the critical section that is described by a linear session type.
In Nomos, contracts are implemented by processes, revealing the concurrent, message-passing
nature of session-typed languages. The implementation below shows the process run representing
the running phase of the auction. It internally stores a linear hashmap of bids b : hashmapbid and a
linear lot l and offers on a shared channel sa : auction. The bid session type (line 1) can be queried
for the stored identifier and bid value, and is offered by a process (not shown) that internally stores
this identifier and money. Line 1 shows the syntax for session type definitions.
1: stype bid = N{addr : id × bid, val : money}, stype bids = hashmapbid
2: (b : bids), (l : lot) ⊢ run :: (sa : auction) % syntax for process declaration
3: sa ← run ← b l = % syntax for process definition
4: la ← accept sa ; % accept a client acquire request
5: la.running ; % auction is running
6: case la ( bid ⇒ r ← recv la ; % receive identifier r : id
7: m ← recv la ; % receive bidm : money
8: sa ← detach la ; % detach from client
9: b ′ ← addbid r ← b m ; % store bid internally
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10: sa ← check ← b ′ l % check if threshold reached
11: | cancel ⇒ sa ← detach la ; % detach from client
12: sa ← run ← b l) % recurse
The contract process first accepts an acquire request by a bidder (line 4) and then sends themessage
running (line 5) indicating the auction status. It then waits for the bidder’s choice. Should the
bidder choose to make a bid, the process waits to receive the bidder’s identifier (line 6) followed
by money equivalent to the bidder’s bid (line 7). After this linear exchange, the process leaves the
critical section by issuing a detach (line 8), matching the bidder’s release request. Internally, the
process stores the pair of the bidder’s identifier and bid in the data structure bids (line 9). The ended
protocol of the contract is governed by a different process (not shown), responsible for distributing
the bids back to the clients. The contract transitions to the ended state when the number of bidders
reaches a threshold (stored in auction). This is achieved by the check process (line 10) which checks
if the threshold has been reached and makes this transition, or calls run otherwise.
Linear Assets. Nomos integrates a linear type system that tracks the assets stored in a process.
The type system enforces that these assets are never duplicated, but only exchanged between
processes. Moreover, the type system forbids a process to terminate while it stores any linear assets,
preventing an asset from being discarded. As an example, the auction contract treatsmoney and lot
as linear assets, which is witnessed by the use of⊸ and ⊗ (type operators for linear exchange) for
their exchange in the auction session type. In contrast, no provisions to handle assets linearly exist
in Solidity, allowing such assets to be created out of thin air, or readily duplicated or discarded. In
the above bid function, for instance, the language does not prevent the programmer from writing
bidValue[bidder] = bid instead, losing the bidder’s previous bid.
Re-Entrancy Vulnerabilities. A contract function is re-entrant if, once called by an external
user, it can potentially be called again before the previous call is completed. As an illustration,
consider the collect function in Solidity of the auction contract (on the left) where the funds are
transferred to the bidder before the hash map is updated to reflect this change.
function collect() public payable {
require (status == ended);
bidder = msg.sender; bid = bidValue[bidder];
bidder.send(bid); bidValue[bidder] = 0; }
function () payable {
// 'auction' variable stores the
// address to auction contract
auction.collect(); }
If a bidder creates a dummy contract with a function that calls collect on the auction contract,
it causes a re-entrant situation. The send function on the left transfers execution control to the
dummy contract, essentially triggering an unnamed fallback function (on the right) in the dummy
contract code base. The fallback function in turn calls collect on the auction leading to an infinite
recursive call to collect, depleting all funds from the auction. This vulnerability was exposed by the
infamous DAO attack [Siegel 2016], where $60 million worth of funds were stolen, and detecting
them has since been critical [Grossman et al. 2017]. The message-passing framework of session
types eliminates this vulnerability.While session types provide multiple clients access to a contract,
the acquire-release discipline ensures that clients interact with the contract in mutual exclusion.
To attempt re-entrancy, a bidder will need to acquire the auction contract twice without releasing
it, and the second acquire would fail to execute.
Resource Cost. Another important aspect of digital contracts is their resource usage. The state
of all the contracts is stored on the blockchain, a distributed ledger which records the history of
all transactions. Executing a contract function, aka transaction and updating the blockchain state
requires new blocks to be added to the blockchain. In existing blockchains like Ethereum, this is
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done by miners who charge a fee based on the gas usage of the transaction, indicating the cost of
its execution. Precisely computing this cost is important because the sender of a transaction must
pay this fee to the miners. If the sender does not pay a sufficient amount, the transaction will be
rejected by the miners and the sender’s fee is lost!
Nomos uses resource-aware session types [Das et al. 2018] to statically analyze the resource
cost of a transaction. They operate by assigning an initial potential to each process. This potential
is consumed by each operation that the process executes or can be transferred between processes
to share and amortize cost. The cost of each operation is defined by a cost model. Resource-aware
session types express the potential as part of the session type using the type constructors ⊳ and ⊲.
The ⊳ constructor prescribes that the client must send potential to the contract, with the amount
of potential indicated as a superscript. Dually, the ⊲ constructor prescribes that the contract must
send potential to the client. In case of the auction contract, we require the client to pay potential
for the operations that the contract must execute, both while placing and collecting their bids. If
the cost model assigns a cost of 1 to each contract operation, then the maximum cost of an auction
session is 22 (taking the max number of operations in all branches). Thus, we require the client to
send 22 units of potential at the start of a session. In the cancel branch of the auction type, on the
other hand, the contract returns 21 units of potential to the client using the ⊲21 type constructor.
This is analogous to gas usage in smart contracts, where the sender initiates a transaction with
some initial gas, and the leftover gas at the end of transaction is returned to the sender. In contrast
to existing smart contract languages like Solidity, which provide no support for analyzing the cost
of a transaction, Nomos type soundness theorem guarantees that the total initial potential of a
process plus the potential it receives during a session reflect the upper bound on the gas usage,
assuming that the cost model assigns a cost equivalent to their gas cost to each operation.
Bringing It All Together. A main contribution of this paper is to combine all these features in
a single language while retaining type safety. To this end, we introduce four different modes of a
channel, identifying the role of the process offered along that channel. The mode R denotes purely
linear processes, typically amounting to linear assets or private data structures, such as b and l in
the auction. The modes S and L denote sharable processes that are either in their shared phase or
linear phase, respectively, and are typically used for contracts, such as sa and la, respectively, in
the auction. The mode T, finally, denotes a transaction process that can refer to shared and linear
processes and is typically issued by a user, such as bidder in the auction. The mode assignment
carries over into the process typing judgments (see Section 4) ascertaining certain well-formedness
conditions (Definition 1) on their type. This introduction of modes is simply a technical device to
preserve the tree structure of linear processes at run-time, establishing type safety.
3 BASE SYSTEM OF SESSION TYPES
Nomos builds on linear session types for message-passing concurrency [Caires and Pfenning 2010;
Honda 1993; Honda et al. 1998, 2008;Wadler 2012] and, in particular, on the line of works that have
a logical foundation due to the existence of a Curry-Howard correspondence between linear logic
and the session-typed π -calculus [Caires and Pfenning 2010; Wadler 2012]. Linear logic [Girard
1987] is a substructural logic that exhibits exchange as the only structural property, with no con-
traction or weakening. As a result, linear propositions can be viewed as resources that must be
used exactly once in a proof. Under the Curry-Howard correspondence, an intuitionistic linear se-
quent A1,A2, . . . ,An ⊢ C can be interpreted as the offer of a session C by a process P using the
sessions A1,A2, . . . ,An
(x1 : A1), (x2 : A2), . . . , (xn : An) ⊢ P :: (z : C)
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Session Type Contin- Process Term Contin- Description
uation uation
c : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L c : Ak c .k ; P P provider sends label k along c
case c (ℓ ⇒ Qℓ)ℓ∈L Qk client receives label k along c
c : N{ℓ : Aℓ} c : Ak case c (ℓ ⇒ Pℓ)ℓ∈L Pk provider receives label k along c
c .k ; Q Q client sends label k along c
c : A ⊗ B c : B send c w ; P P provider sends channel w : A on
c
y ← recv c ; Qy [w/y]Qy client receives channelw : A on c
c : A⊸ B c : B y ← recv c ; Py [w/y]Py provider receives chan. w : A on
c
send c w ; Q Q client sends channelw : A on c
c : 1 − close c − provider sends end along c
wait c ; Q Q client receives end along c
Table 1. Overview of binary session types with their operational description
We label each antecedent as well as the conclusion with the name of the channel along which the
session is provided. The xi ’s correspond to channels used by P , and z is the channel provided by P .
As is standard, we use the linear context ∆ to combine multiple assumptions.
For the typing of processes in Nomos, we extend the above judgment with two additional con-
texts (Ψ and Γ), a resource annotation q, and a modem of the offered channel:
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : A)
We will gradually introduce each concept in the remainder of this article. For future reference,
we show the complete typing rules, with additional contexts, resource annotations, and modes
henceforth, but highlight the parts that will be discussed in later sections in blue.
The Curry-Howard correspondence gives each connective of linear logic an interpretation as a
session type, as demonstrated by the grammar:
A,B ::= ⊕{ℓ : A}ℓ∈K | N{ℓ : A}ℓ∈K | A⊸m B | A ⊗m B | 1
Each type prescribes the kind of message that must be sent or received along a channel of that type
and at which type the session continues after the exchange. Types are definedmutually recursively
in a global signature, where type definitions are constrained to be contractive [Gay and Hole 2005]
(no definitions of the form V = A where A is a type name). This allows us to treat them equi-
recursively [Crary et al. 1999], meaning we can silently replace a type variable by its definition for
type-checking.
Following previous work on session types [Pfenning and Griffith 2015; Toninho et al. 2013], the
process expressions of Nomos are defined as follows.
P ::= x .l ; P | case x (ℓ ⇒ P)ℓ∈K | x ← y | close x | wait x ; P | send x w ; P | y ← recv x ; P
Table 1 provides an overview of the types along with their operational meaning. Because we
adopt the intuitionistic version of linear logic, session types are expressed from the point of view
of the provider. Table 1 provides the viewpoint of the provider in the first line, and that of the client
in the second line for each connective. Columns 1 and 3 describe the session type and process term
before the interaction. Similarly, columns 2 and 4 describe the type and term after the interaction.
Finally, the last column describes the provider and client action. Figure 1 provides the correspond-
ing typing rules. As illustrations of the statics and semantics, we explain internal choice (⊕) and
linear implication (⊸) connectives.
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Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : A) Process P uses linear channels in ∆ and offers type A on channel x
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : Al ) (l ∈ K)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
xm .l ; P :: (xm : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈K )
⊕R
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : Aℓ) ⊢
q
Qℓ :: (zk : C) (∀ℓ ∈ K)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈K ) ⊢
q
case xm (ℓ ⇒ Qℓ)ℓ∈K :: (zk : C)
⊕L
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (yn : A) ⊢
q
P :: (xm : B)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
yn ← recv xm ; P :: (xm : A⊸n B)
⊸n R
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : B) ⊢
q
Q :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (wn : A), (xm : A⊸n B) ⊢
q
send xm wn ; Q :: (zk : C)
⊸n L
q = 0
Ψ ; Γ ; (ym : A) ⊢
q
xm ← ym :: (xm : A)
fwd
Fig. 1. Selected typing rules for process communication
Internal Choice. The linear logic connective A ⊕ B has been generalized to n-ary labeled sum
⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈K . A process that provides x : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈K can send any label l ∈ K along x and then
continues by providing x : Al . The corresponding process term is written as (x .l ; P), where P
is the continuation. A client branches on the label received along x using the term case x (ℓ ⇒
Qℓ)ℓ∈K . The typing rules for the provider and client are ⊕R and ⊕L, respectively, in Figure 1.
The operational semantics is formalized as a system ofmultiset rewriting rules [Cervesato and Scedrov
2009]. We introduce semantic objects proc(cm ,w, P) and msg(cm,w,N ) denoting process P and
message N , respectively, being provided along channel c at modem. The resource annotation w
indicates the work performed so far, the discussion of which we defer to Section 6. Communica-
tion is asynchronous, allowing the sender (cm .l ; P) to continue with P without waiting for l to
be received. As a technical device to ensure that consecutive messages arrive in the order they
were sent, the sender also creates a fresh continuation channel c+m so that the message l is actually
represented as (cm .l ; cm ← c
+
m) (read: send l along cm and continue as c
+
m):
(⊕S) : proc(cm ,w, cm .l ; P) 7→ proc(c
+
m ,w, [c
+
m/cm]P),msg(cm, 0, cm .l ; cm ← c
+
m)
Receiving the message l corresponds to selecting branch Ql and substituting continuation c
+ for
c:
(⊕C) : msg(cm,w, cm .l ; cm ← c
+
m), proc(dk ,w
′, case cm (ℓ ⇒ Qℓ)ℓ∈K ) 7→
proc(dk ,w +w
′, [c+m/cm]Ql )
The message msg(cm,w, cm .l ; cm ← c
+
m) is just a particular form of process, where cm ← c
+
m is
forwarding, which is explained below. Therefore, no separate typing rules for messages are needed;
they can be typed as processes [Balzer and Pfenning 2017].
Channel Passing. Nomos allows the exchange of channels over channels, also referred to as
higher-order channels. A process providing A ⊸n B can receive a channel of type A at mode n
and then continue with providing B. The provider process term is (yn ← recv xm ; P), where
P is the continuation. The corresponding client sends this channel using (send xm wn ; Q). The
corresponding typing rules are presented in Figure 1. Operationally, the client creates a message
containing the channel:
(⊸n S) : proc(dk ,w, send cm en ; P) 7→ msg(c
+
m , 0, send cm en ; c
+
m ← cm), proc(dk ,w, [c
+
m/cm]P)
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The provider receives this channel, and substitutes it appropriately.
(⊸n C) : proc(cm ,w
′, xn ← recv cm ; Q),msg(c
+
m,w, send cm en ; c
+
m ← cm) 7→
proc(c+m ,w +w
′, [c+m/cm][en/xn]Q)
An important distinction from standard session types is that the⊸ and ⊗ types are decorated
with the modem of the channel exchanged. Since modes distinguish the status of the channels in
Nomos, this mode decoration is necessary to ensure type safety.
Forwarding. A forwarding process xm ← ym (which provides channel x ) identifies channels
x and y (both at modem) so that any further communication along x or y occurs on the unified
channel. The typing rule fwd is given in Figure 1 and corresponds to the logical rule of identity.
(id+C) : msg(dm,w
′,N ), proc(cm ,w, cm ← dm) 7→ msg(cm ,w +w
′, [cm/dm]N )
(id−C) : proc(cm,w, cm ← dm),msg(ek ,w
′,N (cm)) 7→ msg(ek ,w +w
′,N (dm))
Operationally, a process c ← d forwards any message N that arrives along d to c and vice versa.
Since linearity ensures that every process has a unique client, forwarding results in terminating
the forwarding process and corresponding renaming of the channel in the client process. The full
semantics are given in the appendix.
4 SHARING CONTRACTS
Multi-user support is fundamental to digital contract development. Linear session types, as defined
in Section 3, unfortunately preclude such sharing because they restrict processes to exactly one
client; only one bidder for the auction, for instance (who will always win!). To support multi-
user contracts, we base Nomos on shared session types [Balzer and Pfenning 2017]. Shared session
types impose an acquire-release discipline on shared processes to guarantee that multiple clients
interact with a contract inmutual exclusion of each other.When a client acquires a shared contract,
it obtains a private linear channel along which it can communicate with the contract undisturbed
by any other clients. Once the client releases the contract, it loses its private linear channel and
only retains a shared reference to the contract.
A key idea of shared session types is to lift the acquire-release discipline to the type level. Gener-
alizing the idea of type stratification [Benton 1994; Pfenning and Griffith 2015; Reed 2009], session
types are stratified into a linear and shared layer with two adjoint modalities going back and forth
between them:
AS ::= ↑
S
L
AL shared session type
AL ::= . . . | ↓
S
L
AS linear session types
The ↑SL type modality translates into an acquire, while the dual ↓
S
L type modality into a release.
Whereas mutual exclusion is one key ingredient to guarantee session fidelity (a.k.a. type preser-
vation) for shared session types, the other key ingredient is the requirement that a session type is
equi-synchronizing. A session type is equi-synchronizing if it imposes the invariant on a process
to be released back to the same type at which the process was previously acquired. This is also
the key behind eliminating re-entrancy vulnerabilities since it prevents a user from interrupting an
ongoing session in the middle and initiating a new one.
Recall the process typing judgment in Nomos Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : A) denoting a process P
offering service of type A along channel x at modem. The contexts Γ and ∆ store the shared and
linear channels that P can refer to, respectively (Ψ and q are explained later and thus marked in
blue in Figure 3). The stratification of channels into layers arises from a difference in structural
properties that exist for types at a mode. Shared propositions exhibit weakening, contraction and
exchange, thus can be discarded or duplicated, while linear propositions only exhibit exchange.
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AR ::= ⊕{ℓ : AR}ℓ∈L | N{ℓ : AR}ℓ∈L | 1 | Am ⊸m AR | Am ⊗m AR | τ → AR | τ ×AR
AL ::= ⊕{ℓ : AL}ℓ∈L | N{ℓ : AL}ℓ∈L | 1 | Am ⊸m AL | Am ⊗m AL | τ → AL | τ ×AL | ↓
S
L
AS
AS ::= ↑
S
L
AL
AT ::= AR
Fig. 2. Grammar for shared session types
AllowingContracts to Rely on Linear Assets. As exemplified by the auction contract, a digital
contract typically amounts to a process that is shared at the outset, but oscillates between shared
and linear to interact with clients, one at a time. Crucial for this pattern is the ability of a contract to
maintain its linear assets (e.g.,money or lot for the auction) regardless of its mode. Unfortunately,
current shared session types [Balzer and Pfenning 2017] do not allow a shared process to rely on
any linear channels, requiring any linear assets to be consumed before becoming shared. This
precaution was logically motivated [Pruiksma et al. 2018] and also crucial for type preservation.
A key novelty of our work is to lift this restriction while maintaining type preservation. The
main concern regarding preservation is to prevent a process from acquiring its client, which would
result in a cycle in the linear process tree. To this end, we factorize the process typing judgment
according to the three roles that arise in digital contract programs: contracts, transactions, and linear
assets. Since contracts are shared and thus can oscillate between shared and linear, we get 4 sub-
judgments for typing processes, each characterized by the mode of the channel being offered.
Definition 1 (Process Typing). The judgmentΨ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : A) is categorized according
to modem. This factorization imposes certain invariants on the judgment outlined below. L(A) denotes
the language generated by the grammar of A.
(1) Ifm = R, then (i) Γ is empty, (ii) for all dk ∈ ∆ =⇒ k = R, and (iii) A ∈ L(AR).
(2) Ifm = S, then (i) for all dk ∈ ∆ =⇒ k = R, and (ii) A ∈ L(AS).
(3) Ifm = L, then A ∈ L(AL).
(4) Ifm = T, then A ∈ L(AT).
Figure 2 shows the session type grammar in Nomos. The first sub-judgment in Definition 1 is
for typing linear assets. These type a purely linear process P using a purely linear context ∆ (types
belonging to grammar AR in Figure 2) and offering a purely linear type A along channel xR. The
mode R of the channel indicates that a purely linear session is offered. The second and third sub-
judgments are for typing contracts. The second sub-judgment shows the type of a contract process
P using a shared context Γ and a purely linear channel context ∆ (judgment∆ purelin) and offering
shared typeA on the shared channel xS. Once this shared channel is acquired by a user, the shared
process transitions to its linear phase, whose typing is governed by the third sub-judgment. The
offered channel transitions to linear mode L, while the linear context may now contain channels
at arbitrary modes (L, T or R). This allows contracts to interact with other contracts without compro-
mising type safety. Finally, the fourth typing judgment types a linear process, corresponding to a
transaction holding access to shared channels Γ and linear channels ∆, and offering at mode T.
This novel factorization and the fact that contracts, as the only shared processes, can only access
linear channels at mode R, upholds preservation while allowing shared contract processes to rely
on linear resources.
Shared session types introduce new typing rules into our system, concerning the acquire-release
constructs (see Figure 3). An acquire is applied to the shared channel xS along which the shared
process offers and yields a linear channel xL when successful. A contract process can accept an
acquire request along its offering shared channel xS. After the accept is successful, the shared
contract process transitions to its linear phase, now offering along the linear channel xL.
The synchronous dynamics of the acquire-accept pair is
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Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : A) Process P uses shared channels in Γ and offers A along x .
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xL : AL) ⊢
q
Q :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (xS :↑
S
L
AL) ; ∆ ⊢
q
xL ← acquire xS ; Q :: (zm : C)
↑S
L
L
∆ purelin Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xL : AL)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
xL ← accept xS ; P :: (xS :↑
S
L
AL)
↑S
L
R
Ψ ; Γ, (xS : AS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
Q :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xL :↓
S
L AS) ⊢
q
xS ← release xL ; Q :: (zm : C)
↓S
L
L
∆ purelin Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xS : AS)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
xS ← detach xL ; P :: (xL :↓
S
L AS)
↓SL R
Fig. 3. Typing rules corresponding to the shared layer.
(↑S
L
C) : proc(aS,w
′, xL ← accept aS ; PxL ), proc(cm,w, xL ← acquire aS ; QxL) 7→
proc(aL,w
′, PaL ), proc(cm,w,QaL)
This rule exploits the invariant that a contract process’ providing channel a can come at two
different modes, a linear one aL, and a shared one aS. The linear channel aL is substituted for the
channel variable xL occurring in the process terms P and Q .
The dual to acquire-accept is release-detach. A client can release linear access to a contract pro-
cess, while the contract process detaches from the client. The corresponding typing rules are pre-
sented in Figure 3. The effect of releasing the linear channel xL is that the continuation Q loses
access to xL, while a new reference to xS is made available in the shared context Γ. The contract, on
the other hand, detaches from the client by transitioning its offering channel from linear mode xL
back to the shared mode xS. Operationally, the release-detach rule is inverse to the acquire-accept
rule.
(↓S
L
C) : proc(aL,w
′, xS ← detach aL ; PxS ), proc(cm ,w, xS ← release aL ; QxS) 7→
proc(aS,w
′, PaS ), proc(cm,w,QaS)
5 ADDING A FUNCTIONAL LAYER
To support general-purpose programming patterns, Nomos combines linear channels with con-
ventional data structures, such as integers, lists, or dictionaries. To reflect and track different
classes of data in the type system, we take inspiration from prior work [Pfenning and Griffith 2015;
Toninho et al. 2013] and incorporate processes into a functional core via a linear contextual monad
that isolates session-based concurrency. To this end, we introduce a separate functional context
to the typing of a process. The linear contextual monad encapsulates open concurrent computa-
tions, which can be passed in functional computations but also transferred between processes in
the form of higher-order processes, providing a uniform integration of higher-order functions and
processes.
The types are separated into a functional and concurrent part, mutually dependent on each
other. The functional types τ are given by the type grammar below.
τ ::= τ → τ | τ + τ | τ × τ | int | bool | Lq(τ )
| {AR ← AR}R | {AS ← AS ; AR}S | {AT ← AS ; A}T
The types are standard, except for the potential annotation q ∈ N in list type Lq(τ ), which we
explain in Section 6, and the contextual monadic types in the last line, which are the topic of this
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Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : A) Process P uses functional values in Ψ, and provides A along x .
r = p + q ∆ = dR : D Ψ . (Ψ1,Ψ2)
Ψ1 
p
M : {A ← D} Ψ2 ; · ; ∆
′
, (xR : A) ⊢
q
Q :: (zR : C)
Ψ ; · ; ∆,∆′ ⊢
r
xR ← M ← dR ; Q :: (zR : C)
{}ERR
Ψ, (y : τ ) ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : A)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
y ← recv xm ; P :: (xm : τ → A)
→ R
r = p + q Ψ . (Ψ1,Ψ2) Ψ1 
p
M : τ Ψ2 ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : A) ⊢
q
Q :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : τ → A) ⊢
r
send xm M ; Q :: (zk : C)
→ L
Fig. 4. Typing rules corresponding to the functional layer.
section. The expressivity of the types and terms in the functional layer are not important for the
development in this paper. Thus, we do not formally define functional terms M but assume that
they have the expected term formers such as function abstraction and application, type construc-
tors, and pattern matching. We also define a standard type judgment for the functional part of the
language.
Ψ 
p
M : τ term M has type τ in functional context Ψ (potential p discussed later)
Contextual Monad. The main novelty in the functional types are the three type formers for
contextual monads, denoting the type of a process expression. The type {AR ← AR}R denotes a
process offering a purely linear session type AR and using the purely linear vector of types AR.
The corresponding introduction form in the functional language is the monadic value constructor
{cR ← P ← dR}, denoting a runnable process offering along channel cR that uses channels dR, all
at mode R. The corresponding typing rule for the monad is (ignore the blue portions)
∆ = dR : D Ψ ; · ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xR : A)
Ψ 
q
{xR ← P ← dR} : {A ← D}R
{}IR
The monadic bind operation implements process composition and acts as the elimination form
for values of type {AR ← AR}R. The bind operation, written as cR ← M ← dR ; Qc , composes the
process underlying the monadic termM , which offers along channel cR and uses channels dR, with
Qc , which uses cR. The typing rule for the monadic bind is rule {}ERR in Figure 4. The linear context
is split between the monad M and continuation Q , enforcing linearity. Similarly, the potential in
the functional context is split using the sharing judgment (.), explained in Section 6. The shared
context Γ is empty in accordance with the invariants established in Definition 1 (i), since the mode
of offered channel z is R. The effect of executing a bind is the spawn of the purely linear process
corresponding to the monad M , and the parent process continuing with Q . The corresponding
operational semantics rule (named spawnRR) is given as follows:
proc(dR,w, xR ← {x
′
R ← Px ′R,y ← y} ← a ; Q) 7→ proc(cR, 0, PcR,a), proc(dR,w, [cR/xR]Q)
The above rule spawns the process P offering along a globally fresh channel cR, and using channels
a. The continuation process Q acts as a client for this fresh channel cR. The other two monadic
types correspond to spawning a shared process {AS ← AS ; AR}S and a transaction process
{AT ← AS ; A}T at mode S and T, respectively. Their rules are analogous to {}IR and {}ERR .
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Value Communication. Communicating a value of the functional language along a channel
is expressed at the type level by adding the following two session types.
A ::= . . . | τ → A | τ ×A
The type τ → A prescribes receiving a value of type τ with continuation type A, while its dual
τ × A prescribes sending a value of type τ with continuation A. The corresponding typing rules
for arrow (→ R,→ L) are given in Figure 4 (rules for × are inverse). Receiving a value adds it to
the functional context Ψ, while sending it requires proving that the value has type τ . Semantically,
sending a valueM : τ creates a message predicate along a fresh channel c+m containing the value:
(→ S) : proc(dk ,w, send cm M ; P) 7→ msg(c
+
m, 0, send cm M ; c
+
m ← cm), proc(dk ,w, [c
+
m/cm]P)
The recipient process substitutes M for x , and continues to offer along the fresh continuation
channel received by the message. This ensures that messages are received in the order they are
sent. The rule is formalized below.
(→ C) : proc(cm,w
′, x ← recv cm ; Q),msg(c
+
m,w, send cm M ; c
+
m ← cm) 7→
proc(c+m ,w +w
′, [c+m/cm][M/x]Q)
Tracking Linear Assets. As an illustration, consider the typemoney introduced in the auction
example (Section 2). The type is an abstraction over funds stored in a process and is described as
money = N{value : int ×money, % send value
add : money⊸R money, % receive money and add it
subtract : int → ⊕{sufficient : money ⊗R money, % receive int, send money
insufficient : money} % funds insufficient to subtract
coins : listcoin} % send list of coins
The type supports querying for value, and addition and subtraction. The type also expresses insuf-
ficiency of funds in the case of subtraction. The provider process only supplies money to the client
if the requested amount is less than the current balance, as depicted in the sufficient label. The
type is implemented by a wallet process that internally stores a linear list of coins and an integer
representing its value. Since linearity is only enforced on the list of coins in the linear context, we
trust the programmer updates the integer in the functional context correctly during transactions.
The process is typed and implemented as (modes of channels l andm is R, skipped in the definition
for brevity)
1: (n : int) ; (lR : listcoin) ⊢ wallet :: (mR : money)
2: m ← wallet n ← l =
3: casem % case analyze on label received onm
4: (value⇒ sendm n ; % receive value, send n
5: m ← wallet n ← l
6: | add ⇒m′ ← recvm ; % receivem′ : money to add
7: m′.value ; % query value ofm′
8: v ← recvm′ ;
9: m′.coins ; % extract list of coins stored inm′
10: k ← append ← l m′ ; % append list received to internal list
11: m ← wallet (n +v) ← k
12: | subtract ⇒ n′ ← recvm ; % receive int to subtract
13: if (n′ > n) then
14: m.insufficient ; % funds insufficient
15: m ← wallet n ← l
16: else
17: m.sufficient ; % funds sufficient
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18: l ′ ← remove n′ ← l ; % remove n′ coins from l
19: k ← recv l ′ ; % and create its own list
20: m′ ← wallet n′ ← k ; % new wallet process for subtracted funds
21: sendm m′ ; % send new money channel to client
22: m ← wallet (n − n′) ← l ′
23: | coins ⇒m ← l)
If the wallet process receives the message value, it sends back the integer n, and recurses (lines 4
and 5). If it receives the message add followed by a channel of type money (line 6), it queries the
value of the received moneym′ (line 7), stores it inv (line 8), extracts the coins stored inm′ (line 9),
and appends them to its internal list of coins (line 10). Similarly, if the wallet process receives the
message subtract followed by an integer, it compares the requested amount against the stored
funds. If the balance is insufficient, it sends the corresponding label, and recurses (lines 14 and
15). Otherwise, it removes n′ coins using the remove process (line 18), creates amoney abstraction
using the wallet process (line 20), sends it (line 21) and recurses. Finally, if the wallet receives the
message coins, it simply forwards its internal list along the offered channel.
6 TRACKING RESOURCE USAGE
Resource usage is particularly important in digital contracts: Since multiple parties need to agree
on the result of the execution of a contract, the computation is potentially performed multiple
times or by a trusted third party. This immediately introduces the need to prevent denial of service
attacks and to distribute the cost of the computation among the participating parties.
The predominant approach for smart contracts on blockchains like Ethereum is not to restrict
the computation model but to introduce a cost model that defines the gas consumption of low
level operations. Any transaction with a smart contract needs to be executed and validated before
adding it to the global distributed ledger, i.e., blockchain. This validation is performed by miners,
who charge fees based on the gas consumption of the transaction. This fee has to be estimated
and provided by the sender prior to the transaction. If the provided amount does not cover the gas
cost, the money falls to the miner, the transaction fails, and the state of the contract is reverted
back. Overestimates bare the risk of high losses if the contract has flaws or vulnerabilities.
It is not trivial to decide on the right amount for the fee since the gas cost of the contract
does not only depend on the requested transaction but also on the (a priori unknown) state of the
blockchain. Thus, precise and static estimation of gas cost facilitates transactions and reduces risks.
We discuss our approach of tracking resource usage, both at the functional and process layer.
Functional Layer. Numerous techniques have been proposed to statically derive resource bounds
for functional programs [Avanzini et al. 2015; Cicek et al. 2017; Danner et al. 2015; Lago and Gaboardi
2011; Radiček et al. 2017]. In Nomos, we adapt the work on automatic amortized resource analysis
(AARA) [Hoffmann et al. 2011; Hofmann and Jost 2003] that has been implemented in Resource
Aware ML (RaML) [Hoffmann et al. 2017]. RaML can automatically derive worst-case resource
bounds for higher-order polymorphic programs with user-defined inductive types. The derived
bounds are multivariate resource polynomials of the size parameters of the arguments. AARA is
parametric in the resource metric and can deal with non-monotone resources like memory that
can become available during the evaluation.
As an illustration, consider the function applyInterest that iterates over a list of balances and
applies interest on each element, multiplying them by a constant c . An imperative version of the
same function in Solidity is implemented in Section 8. We use tick annotations to define the re-
source usage of an expression in this article. We have annotated the code to count the number of
multiplications. The resource usage of an evaluation of applyInterest b is |b |.
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let applyInterest balances =
match balances with
| [] -> []
| hd::tl -> tick(1); (c*hd)::(applyInterest tl) (* consume unit potential for tick *)
The idea of AARA is to decorate base types with potential annotations that define a potential
function as in amortized analysis. The typing rules ensure that the potential before evaluating an
expression is sufficient to cover the cost of the evaluation and the potential defined by the return
type. This posterior potential can then be used to pay for resource usage in the continuation of
the program. For example, we can derive the following resource-annotated type.
applyInterest : L1(int) −−−→0/0 L0(int)
The type L1(int) denotes a list of integers assigning a unit potential to each element in the list. The
return value, on the other hand, has no potential. The annotation on the function arrow indicates
that we do not need any potential to call the function and that no constant potential is left after
the function call has returned.
In a larger program, we might want to call the function applyInterest again on the result of a
call to the function. In this case, we would need to assign the type L1(int) to the resulting list
and require L2(int) for the argument. In general, the type for the function can be described with
symbolic annotations with linear constraints between them. To derive a worst-case bound for a
function the constraints can be solved by an off-the-shelf LP solver, even if the potential functions
are polynomial [Hoffmann et al. 2011, 2017].
In Nomos, we simply adopt the standard typing judgment of AARA for functional programs.
Ψ 
q
M : τ
It states that under the resource-annotated functional context Ψ, with constant potential q, the
expression M has the resource-aware type τ .
The operational cost semantics is defined by the judgment
M ⇓ V | µ
which states that the closed expressionM evaluates to the valueV with cost µ . The type soundness
theorem states that if · 
q
M : τ andM ⇓ V | µ then q ≥ µ .
More details aboutAARA canbe found in the literature [Hoffmann et al. 2017; Hofmann and Jost
2003] and the appendix.
Process Layer. To bound the resource usage of a process, Nomos features resource-aware ses-
sion types [Das et al. 2018] for work analysis. Resource-aware session types describe resource con-
tracts for inter-process communication. The type system supports amortized analysis by assigning
potential to both messages and processes. The derived resource bounds are functions of interac-
tions between processes. As an illustration, consider the following resource-aware list interface
from prior work [Das et al. 2018].
listA = ⊕{nil
0 : 10, cons1 : A
0
⊗ listA}
The type prescribes that the provider of a list must send one unit of potential with every cons
message that it sends. Dually, a client of this list will receive a unit potential with every consmes-
sage. All other type constructors are marked with potential 0, and exchanging the corresponding
messages does not lead to transfer of potential.
While resource-aware session types inNomos are equivalent to the existing formulation [Das et al.
2018], our version is simpler and more streamlined. Instead of requiring every message to carry a
potential (and potentially tagging several messages with 0 potential), we introduce two new type
constructors for exchanging potential.
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Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : A) Process P has potential q and provides type A along channel x .
p = q + r Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
p
P :: (xm : A)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
get xm {r } ; P :: (xm : ⊳
rA)
⊳R
q = p + r Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : A) ⊢
p
P :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : ⊳
rA) ⊢
q
pay xm {r } ; P :: (zk : C)
⊳L
q = p + r Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
p
P :: (xm : A)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
tick (r ) ; P :: (xm : A)
tick
Fig. 5. Selected typing rules corresponding to potential.
A ::= . . . | ⊲rA | ⊳rA
The type ⊲rA requires the provider to pay r units of potential which are transferred to the client.
Dually, the type ⊳rA requires the client to pay r units of potential that are received by the provider.
Thus, the reformulated list type becomes
listA = ⊕{nil : 1, cons : ⊲
1(A ⊗ listA)}
The reformulation is more compact since we need to account for potential in only the typing rules
corresponding to ⊲rA and ⊳rA.
With all aspects introduced, the process typing judgment
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : A)
denotes a process P accessing functional variables in Ψ, shared channels in Γ, linear channels in ∆,
offers service of typeA along channel x at modem and stores a non-negative constant potential q.
Similarly, the expressing typing judgment
Ψ 
p
M : τ
denotes that expression M has type τ in the presence of functional context Ψ and potential p.
Figure 5 shows the rules that interact with the potential annotations. In the rule ⊳R, process
P storing potential q receives r units along the offered channel xm using the get construct and
the continuation executes with p = q + r units of potential. In the dual rule ⊳L, a process storing
potential q = p + r sends r units along the channel xm in its context using the pay construct, and
the continuation remains with p units of potential. The typing rules for the dual constructor ⊲rA
are the exact inverse. Finally, executing the tick (r ) construct consumes r potential from the stored
process potential q, and the continuation remains with p = q−r units, as described in the tick rule.
Integration. Since both AARA for functional programs and resource-aware session types are
based on the integration of the potential method into their type systems, their combination is nat-
ural. The two points of integration of the functional and process layer are (i) spawning a process,
and (ii) sending/receiving a value from the functional layer. Recall the spawn rule {}ERR from Fig-
ure 4. A process storing potential r = p + q can spawn a process corresponding to the monadic
value M , if M needs p units of potential to evaluate, while the continuation needs q units of po-
tential to execute. Moreover, the functional context Ψ is shared in the two premises as Ψ1 and Ψ2
using the judgment Ψ . (Ψ1,Ψ2). This judgment, already explored in prior work [Hoffmann et al.
2017] describes that the base types in Ψ are copied to both Ψ1 and Ψ2, but the potential is split
up. For instance, Lq1+q2(τ ) . (Lq1(τ ), Lq2(τ )). The rule → L follows a similar pattern. Thus, the
combination of the two type systems is smooth, assigning a uniform meaning to potential, both
for the functional and process layer.
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Remarkably, this technical device of exchanging functional values can be used to exchange non-
constant potential with messages. As an illustration, we revisit the auction protocol introduced
in Section 2. Suppose the bids were stored in a list, instead of a hash map, thus making the cost
of collection of winnings linear in the worst case, rather than constant. A user would then be
required to send a linear potential after acquiring the contract. This can be done by sending a
natural number n : natq , storing potential q · |n | (like a unary list), where q is the cost of iterating
over an element in the list of bids. The contract would then iterate over the first n elements of the
list and refund the remaining gas if n exceeds the length. Since the auction state is public, a user
can view the size of the list of bids, compute the required potential, store it in a natural number,
and transfer it. It would still be possible that a user does not provide enough fuel to reach the
sought-after element in the list. However, this behavior is clearly visible in the protocol and code
and out-of-gas exceptions are not possible.
Operational Cost Semantics. The resource usage of a process (or message) is tracked in se-
mantic objects proc(c,w, P) and msg(c,w,N ) using the local counters w . This signifies that the
process P (or message N ) has performedworkw so far. The rules of semantics that explicitly affect
the work counter are
M ⇓ V | µ
proc(cm,w, P[M]) 7→ proc(cm,w + µ, P[V ])
internal
This rule describes that if an expression M evaluates to V with cost µ , then the process P[M] de-
pending onmonadic expressionM steps to P[V ], while the work counter increments by µ , denoting
the total number of internal steps taken by the process. At the process layer, the work increments
on executing a tick operation.
proc(cm,w, tick (µ) ; P) 7→ proc(cm ,w + µ, P)
A new process (or message) is spawned with w = 0, and a terminating process transfers its work
to the corresponding message it interacts with before termination, thus preserving the total work
performed by the system.
7 TYPE SOUNDNESS
Themain theorems that exhibit the connections between our type system and the operational cost
semantics are the usual type preservation and progress. First, Definition 1 asserts certain invariants
on process typing judgment depending on the mode of the channel offered by a process. This
mode, remains invariant, as the process evolves. This is ensured by the process typing rules, which
remarkably preserve these invariants despite being parametric in the mode.
Lemma 1 (Invariants). The typing rules on the judgment Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
(xm : A) preserve the
invariants outlined in Definition 1, i.e., if the conclusion satisfies the invariant, so do all the premises.
Configuration Typing. At run-time, a program evolves into a number of processes and mes-
sages, represented by proc and msg predicates. This multiset of predicates is referred to as a con-
figuration (abbreviated as Ω).
Ω ::= · | Ω, proc(c,w, P) | Ω,msg(c,w,N )
A key question is how to type these configurations because a configuration both uses and pro-
vides a number of channels. The solution is to have the typing imposes a partial order among the
processes and messages, requiring the provider of a channel to appear before its client. We stipu-
late that no two distinct processes or messages in a well-formed configuration provide the same
channel c .
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The typing judgment for configurations has the form Σ ; Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆) defining a configura-
tion Ω providing shared channels in Γ and linear channels in ∆. Additionally, we need to track the
mapping between the shared channels and their linear counterparts offered by a contract process,
switching back and forth between them when the channel is acquired or released respectively.
This mapping, along with the type of the shared channels, is stored in Γ0. E is a natural number
and stores the sum of the total potential and work as recorded in each process and message. We
call E the energy of the configuration. The appendix details the configuration typing rules.
Finally, Σ denotes a signature storing the type and function definitions. A signature is well-
formed if (i) every type definitionV = AV is contractive [Gay and Hole 2005] and (ii) every function
definition f = M : τ is well-typed according to the expression typing judgment Σ ; · 
p
M : τ .
The signature does not contain process definitions; every process is encapsulated inside a function
using the contextual monad.
Theorem 1 (Type Preservation).
• If a closed well-typed expression · 
q
M : τ evaluates to a value, i.e., M ⇓ V | µ , then q ≥ µ and
· 
q−µ
V : τ .
• Consider a closed well-formed and well-typed configuration Ω such that Σ ; Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆). If
the configuration takes a step, i.e. Ω 7→ Ω′, then there exist Γ′0 , Γ
′ such that Σ ; Γ′0
E
 Ω
′ :: (Γ′ ; ∆),
i.e., the resulting configuration is well-typed. Additionally, Γ0 ⊆ Γ
′
0 and Γ ⊆ Γ
′.
The preservation theorem is standard for expressions [Hoffmann et al. 2017]. For processes, we
proceed by induction on the operational cost semantics and inversion on the configuration and
process typing judgment.
To state progress, we need the notion of a poised process [Pfenning and Griffith 2015]. A process
proc(cm,w, P) is poised if it is trying to receive amessage on cm . Dually, a messagemsg(cm,w,N ) is
poised if it is sending along cm . A configuration is poised if every message or process in the config-
uration is poised. Intuitively, this means that the configuration is trying to interact with the outside
world along a channel in Γ or ∆. Additionally, a process can be blocked [Balzer and Pfenning 2017]
if it is trying to acquire a contract process that has already been acquired by some process. This
can lead to the possibility of deadlocks.
Theorem 2 (Progress). Consider a closed well-formed and well-typed configuration Ω such that
Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆). Either Ω is poised, or it can take a step, i.e., Ω 7→ Ω′, or some process in Ω is blocked
along aS for some shared channel aS and there is a process proc(aL,w, P) ∈ Ω.
The progress theorem is weaker than that for binary linear session types, where progress guar-
antees deadlock freedom due to absence of shared channels.
8 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We have developed an open-source prototype implementation [Nom 2019] of Nomos in OCaml.
This prototype contains a lexer and parser (369 lines of code), a type checker (3039 lines of code),
a pretty printer (500 lines of code), and an LP solver interface (914 lines of code).
Syntax. The lexer and parser forNomoshave been implemented inMenhir [Pottier and Régis-Gianas
2019], an LR(1) parser generator for OCaml. A Nomos program is a list of mutually recursive type
and process definitions. To visually separate out functional variables from session-typed channels,
we require that shared channels are prefixed by #, while linear channels are prefixed by $. This
avoids confusion between the two, both for the programmer and the parser. We also require the
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programmer to indicate the mode of the process being defined: asset, contract or transaction, as-
signing the respective modes R, S and T to the offered channel. The modes for all other channels
are inferred automatically (explained later). The initial potential {q} of a process is marked on the
turnstile in the declaration. The syntax for definitions is
stype v = A
proc <mode> f : (x1 : T), ($c2 : A), ... |{q}- ($c : A) = M
In the context, T is the functional type for variable x1, while A is the session type for channel
$c2 and M is a functional expression implementing the process. We add syntactic sugar, such as
the forms let x = M; P and if M then P1 else P2, to the process layer to ease programming. Finally,
a functional expression can enter the session type monad using {}, i.e., M = {P} where P is a
session-typed expression.
Type Checking. We implemented a bi-directional [Pierce and Turner 2000] type checker with
a specific focus on the quality of error messages, which include, for example, extent (source code
location) information for each definition and expression. The programmer provides the initial type
of each variable and channel in the declaration and the definition is checked against it, while recon-
structing the intermediate types. This helps localize the source of a type error as the point where
type reconstruction fails. Type equality is implemented using a standard co-inductive algorithm
[Gay and Hole 2005]. Type checking is linear time in the size of the program, which is important in
settings where type checking is part of the attack surface.
Potential and Mode Inference. The potential and mode annotations are the most interesting
aspects of the Nomos type system. Since modes are associated with each channel, they are tedious
to write. Similarly, the exact potential annotations depend on the cost assigned to each operation
and is difficult to predict statically. Thus, we implemented an inference algorithm of both these
annotations.
Using ideas from existing techniques for type inference forAARA [Hoffmann et al. 2017; Hofmann and Jost
2003], we reduce the reconstruction of potential annotations to linear optimization. To this end,
Nomos’ type checker uses the Coin-Or LP solver. In a Nomos program, the programmer can indi-
cate unknown potential using ∗. Thus, resource-aware session types can be marked with ⊲∗ and ⊳∗,
list types can be marked as L∗(τ ) and process definitions can be markedwith |{∗}− on the turnstile.
The mode of all the channels is marked as ‘unknown’ while parsing.
The inference engine iterates over the program and substitutes the star annotations with poten-
tial variables and ‘unknown’ with mode variables. Then, the bidirectional typing rules are applied,
approximately checking the program (modulo potential and mode annotations) while also gener-
ating linear constraints for potential annotations (see Figure 4). and mode annotations (see Defi-
nition 1 and Figure 3). Finally, these constraints are shipped to the LP solver, which is minimizing
the value of the potential annotations to achieve tight bounds. The LP solver either returns that
the constraints are infeasible, or returns a satisfying assignment, which is then substituted into the
program. The final program is pretty printed for the programmer to view and verify the potential
and mode annotations.
8.1 Case Studies
We evaluate the design of Nomos by implementing several smart contract applications and dis-
cussing the typical issues that arise. All the contracts are implemented and type checked in the
prototype implementation and the potential and mode annotations are derived automatically by
the inference engine. The cost model used for these examples assigns 1 unit of cost to every atomic
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internal computation and sending of a message. We show the contract types from the implemen-
tation with the following ASCII format: i) /\ for ↑S
L
, ii) \/ for ↓S
L
, iii) <{q}| for ⊳q , iv) |{q}> for ⊲q ,
v) ^ for ×, vi) *[m] for ⊗m , vii) -o[m] for⊸m .
ERC-20 Token Standard. Tokens are a representation of a particular asset or utility, that re-
sides on top of an existing blockchain. ERC-20 [ERC 2018] is a technical standard for smart con-
tracts on the Ethereum blockchain that defines a common list of standard functions that a token
contract has to implement. The majority of tokens on the Ethereum blockchain are ERC-20 com-
pliant. The standard requires the following functions to be implemented:
• totalSupply() : returns the total number of tokens in supply as an integer.
• balanceOf(id owner) : returns the account balance of owner.
• transfer(id to, int value) : transfers value tokens from sender’s account to identifier to.
• transferFrom(id from, id to, int value) : transfers value number of tokens from identifier from
to identifier to.
• approve(id spender, int value) : allows spender to withdraw from sender’s account up to value
number of tokens.
• allowance(id owner, id spender) : returns the number of tokens spender is allowed to with-
draw from owner.
The ERC-20 token contract implements the following session type in Nomos:
type erc20token = /\ <{11}| &{
totalSupply : int ^ |{9}> \/ erc20token,
balanceOf : id -> int ^ |{8}> \/ erc20token,
transfer : id -> id -> int -> |{0}> \/ erc20token,
approve : id -> id -> int -> |{6}> \/ erc20token,
allowance : id -> id -> int ^ |{6}> \/ erc20token }
The type ensures that the token implements the protocol underlying the ERC-20 standard. To query
the total number of tokens in supply, a client sends the totalSupply label, and the contract sends
back an integer. If the contract receives the balanceOf label followed by the owner’s identifier, it
sends back an integer corresponding to the owner’s balance. A balance transfer can be initiated
by sending the transfer label to the contract followed by sender’s and receiver’s identifier, and the
amount to be transferred. If the contract receives approve, it receives the two identifiers and the
value, and updates the allowance internally. Finally, this allowance can be checked by issuing the
allowance label, and sending the owner’s and spender’s identifier.
A programmer can design their own implementation (contract) of the erc20token session type.
Internally, the contract relies on custom coins created and named by its owner and used exclusively
for exchanges among private accounts. These coins can be minted by a special transaction that
can only be issued by the owner and that creates coins out of thin air (consuming gas to create
coins). Depending on the functionality intended by the owner, they can employ different types to
represent their coins. For instance, choosing type 1, the multiplicative unit from linear logic, will
allow both creation and destruction of coins “for free". Amint-one process, typed as · ⊢ mint-one ::
(c : 1), can create coin c out of thin air (by closing channel c) and a burn-one process, typed as
(c : 1) ⊢ burn-one :: (d : 1), will destroy the coin c (by waiting on channel c). Nomos’ linear type
system enforces that the coins are treated linearly modulo minting and burning. Any transaction
that does not involve minting or burning ensures linearity of these coins.
One specific implementation of the erc20token session type can be achieved by storing two lists,
one for the balance of each account, and one for the allowance between each pair of accounts. The
account balance needs to be treated linearly, hence we place this balance list in the linear context,
while we store the allowance list in the functional context. In this contract, we call the custom
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 1, No. CONF, Article 1. Publication date: January 2018.
Resource-Aware Session Types 1:21
coin plcoin, and use plcoins to mean listplcoin. The account balance is abstracted using the account
type:
account = N{addr : id × account, % send identifier
add : plcoins⊸ account, % receive pl coins and add internally
subtract : int → plcoins ⊗ account} % receive integer, send pl coins
This allows a client to query for the identifier stored in the account, aswell as add and subtract from
the account balance. We ignore the resource consumption as it is not relevant to the example. The
balance process provides the account abstraction. It internally stores the identifier in its functional
context and pl coins in its linear context, and offers along the linear account type.
(r : id) ; (M : plcoins) ⊢ balance :: (acc : account)
Finally, the contract process stores the allowances as a list of triples storing the owner’s and
sender’s address and allowance value, typed as id× id× int. Thus, the plcontract process stores the
allowance in the functional context, and the list of accounts in its linear context and offers along
the erc20token type introduced earlier.
(allow : listid×id×int) ; (accs : listaccount) ⊢ plcontract :: (st : erc20token)
As an illustration, we show the part of the implementation for initiating a transfer.
1: st ← plcontract allow ← accs =
2: lt ← accept st ; % accept a client acquire request
3: case lt . . . % switch on label on lt
4: | transfer ⇒ s ← recv lt ; % receive sender’s identifier s : id
5: r ← recv lt ; % receive receiver’s identifier r : id
6: v ← recv lt ; % receive transfer value v : int
7: st ← detach lt ; % detach from client
8: . . . % extract sender and receiver’s account . . .
9: . . . % and store in sa and ra resp.
10: sa.subtract ; % subtract pl coins corresponding to . . .
11: sa.v ; % v from account channel sa
12: m ← recv sa % receive transfer amountm
13: ra.add ; % addm : plcoins to . . .
14: send ra m ; % account channel ra
15: st ← plcontract allow ← accs
The contract first receives the sender and receiver’s identifiers (lines 4 and 5) and the transfer value
v . The contract then detaches from the client (line 7). We skip the code of extracting the sender’s
and receiver’s account from the list accs and store them in sa and ra of type account, respectively.
The contract then subtracts the pl coins from account sa (lines 10 and 11) and receives and stores
them in m (line 12). This balance is then added to ra’s account (lines 13 and 14). An important
point here is that Nomos enforces linearity of the transfer transaction. Sincem : plcoins is typed
as a linear asset, it cannot be discarded or modified. The amount deducted from sender must be
transferred to the receiver (since no minting is involved here).
Hacker Gold (HKG) Token. The HKG token is one particular implementation of the ERC-20
token specification. Recently, a vulnerability was discovered in the HKG token smart contract
based on a typographical error leading to a re-issuance of the entire token [HKG 2017].
The typographical error in the contract came about when updating the receiver’s balance during
a transfer. Instead of writing balance += value, the programmer mistakenly wrote balance =+ value
(semantically meaning balance = value). Moreover, while testing this error was missed, because
the first transfer always succeeds (since the two statements are semantically equivalent when
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 1, No. CONF, Article 1. Publication date: January 2018.
1:22 Ankush Das, Stephanie Balzer, Jan Hoffmann, Frank Pfenning, and Ishani Santurkar
balance = 0). Nomos’ type system would have caught the linearity violation in the latter statement
that drops the existing balance in the recipient’s account.
Puzzle Contract. This contract, taken from prior work [Luu et al. 2016] rewards users who
solve a computational puzzle and submit the solution. The contract allows two functions, one that
allows the owner to update the reward, and the other that allows a user to submit their solution
and collect the reward.
In Nomos, this contract is implemented to offer the type
type puzzle = /\ <{14}| &{
update : id -> money -o[R] |{0}> \/ puzzle,
submit : int ^ &{
success : int -> money *[R] |{5}> \/ puzzle,
failure : |{9}> \/ puzzle } }
The contract still supports the two transactions. To update the reward, it receives the update label
and an identifier, verifies that the sender is the owner, receives money from the sender, and acts
like a puzzle again. The transaction to submit a solution has a guard associated with it. First, the
contract sends an integer corresponding to the reward amount, the user then verifies that the
reward matches the expected reward (the guard condition). If this check succeeds, the user sends
the success label, followed by the solution, receives the winnings, and the session terminates. If
the guard fails, the user issues the failure label and immediately terminates the session. Thus, the
contract implementation guarantees that the user submitting the solution receives their expected
winnings.
Voting. The voting contract provides a ballot type.
type ballot = /\ <{22}| +{
open : id -> +{ vote : id -> |{0}> \/ ballot,
novote : |{14}> \/ ballot },
closed : id ^ |{19}> \/ ballot }
This contract allows voting when the election is open by sending the candidate’s id, and prevents
double voting by checking if the voter has already voted (the novote label). Once the election
closes, the contract can be acquired to check the winner. We use two implementations for the
contract: the first (voting in Table 2) stores a counter for each candidate that is updated after each
vote is cast; the second (voting-aa in Table 2) does not use a counter but stores potential inside the
vote list that is consumed for counting the votes at the end. This stored potential is provided by
the voter to amortize the cost of counting.
Escrow. A contract can act as a reliable third party for custody of a bond that takes effect once
both the buyer and the seller approve.
type escrow = /\ <{7}| &{
approve : id -> |{0}> \/ escrow,
cancel : id -> |{0}> \/ escrow,
deposit : id -> bond -o[R] |{4}> \/ escrow,
withdraw : id -> bond *[R] |{0}> \/ escrow }
This session type describes the implementation of an escrow, allowing the seller to deposit the
bond, the buyer to withdraw the bond, and both the buyer and seller to approve or cancel the
whole transaction. The withdrawal succeeds only after the bond has been deposited, and both the
buyer and seller approve it.
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Contract LOC T (ms) Vars Cons I (ms) Gap
auction 176 0.558 229 730 5.225 3
ERC 20 136 0.579 161 561 4.317 6
puzzle 108 0.410 126 389 8.994 8
voting 101 0.324 109 351 3.664 0
voting-aa 101 0.346 140 457 3.926 0
escrow 85 0.404 95 321 3.816 3
insurance 56 0.299 76 224 8.289 0
bank 147 0.663 173 561 4.549 0
wallet 30 0.231 32 102 3.224 0
Table 2. Evaluation of Nomos with Case Studies. LOC = lines of code; T (ms) = the type checking time in
ms; Vars = #variables generated during type inference; Cons = #constraints generated during type inference;
I (ms) = type inference time in ms; Gap = maximal gas bound gap.
Experimental Evaluation. We implemented 8 case studies in Nomos. We have already dis-
cussed auction (Section 2), ERC 20, puzzle, and voting. The other case studies are:
• A bank account that allows users to register, make deposits and withdrawals and check the
balance.
• An escrow to exchange bonds between two parties.
• A wallet allowing users to store money on the blockchain.
• An insurance contract that processes flight delay insurance claims after verifying them with
a trusted third party. This contract involves inter-contract communication since the insurance
and the third-party verifier are implemented as separate contracts.
Table 2 contains a compilation of our experiments with the case studies and the prototype imple-
mentation. The experiments were run on an Intel Core i5 2.7 GHz processor with 16 GB 1867 MHz
DDR3 memory. It presents the contract name, its lines of code (LOC), the type checking time (T
(ms)), number of potential and mode variables introduced (Vars), number of potential and mode
constraints that were generated while type checking (Cons) and the time the LP solver took to in-
fer their values (I (ms)). The last column describes the maximal gap between the static gas bound
inferred and the actual runtime gas cost. It accounts for the difference in the gas cost in different
program paths. However, this waste is clearly marked in the program by explicit tick instructions
so the programmer is aware of this runtime gap, based on the program path executed.
The evaluation shows that the type-checking overhead is less than a millisecond for case stud-
ies. This indicates that Nomos is applicable to settings like distributed blockchains in which type
checking could add significant overhead and could be part of the attack surface. Type inference
is also efficient but an order of magnitude slower than type checking. This is acceptable since in-
ference is only performed once during deployment of the contract. Gas bounds are tight in most
cases. Loose gas bounds are caused by conditional branches with different gas cost. In practice,
this is not a major concern since the Nomos semantics tracks the exact gas cost, and a user will
not be overcharged for their transaction. However, Nomos’ type system can be easily modified to
only allow contracts with tight bounds.
Our implementation experience revealed that describing the session type of a contract crystal-
lizes the important aspects of its protocol. Once the type is defined, the implementation simply
follows the type protocol. The error messages from the type checker were helpful in ensuring lin-
earity of assets, and using ∗ for potential annotations meant we could remain unaware of the exact
gas cost of operations.
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9 BLOCKCHAIN INTEGRATION
Although Nomos has been designed to be applicable for implementing general digital contracts,
the standard semantics needs some adaptation for a contract to be run on a blockchain. To integrate
with a blockchain, we need a mechanism to (i) represent the contracts and their addresses in the
current blockchain state, (ii) create and send transactions to the appropriate addresses, and most
importantly, (iii) construct the global distributed ledger, which stores the history of all transactions.
This section addresses these challenges and also highlights the main limitation of the language.
Nomos on a Blockchain. To describe a possible blockchain implementation of Nomos, we as-
sume a blockchain like Ethereum that contains a set of Nomos contractsC1, . . . ,Cn together with
their type information Ψi ; Γi ; ∆i
R
⊢
qi Ci :: (x
i
S
: Ai
S
). The functional contexts Ψi type the contract
data, while the shared contexts Γi type the shared contracts thatCi refer to, and the linear contexts
∆
i
R
type the contract’s linear assets. We allow contracts to carry potential given by the annotations
qi and the potential defined by the annotations in Ψ
i and ∆i
R
. This potential is useful to amortize
gas cost over different transactions. If this behavior is not desired then one can require qi = 0 for
every i . Together, these contracts define the blockchain state. The channel name x i
S
of a contract is
its address and has to be globally unique. We assume the existence of a deterministic mechanism
that produces fresh names.
To perform a transaction with a contract, an external user submits a script that is well-typed
with respect to the existing contracts using the judgment
Ψ ; Γ ; · ⊢
q
Q :: (xT : 1)
Here, Γ ⊆ x1S : A
1
S, . . . , x
n
S
: An
S
stores references to the Nomos contracts accessible by the transac-
tion. Ψ stores the functional part of the script, and since the script cannot refer to linear data, its
linear context is empty. Additionally, we mandate that the transaction offers along a channel of
type 1, and that it terminates by sending a closemessage on its offered channel. For instance, the
transaction Q must end with the operation (close xT). This ensures that transactions are sequen-
tialized and executed in the order they are queued (explained below).
A transaction script is connected to the blockchain state using a server process. This process,
named bc−server stores the entire transaction history and offers along channel bc : tx_interface
where the transaction code is received and relayed to the blockchain state. It is defined as follows.
1: type tx_code = {1} type tx_queue = list tx_code
2: stype tx_interface = tx_code→ tx_interface
3: (txns : tx_queue) ; · ; · ⊢
0
bc−server :: (bc : tx_interface)
4: bc ← bc−server txns =
5: tx ← recv bc ; xT ← tx ; wait xT ;
6: bc ← bc−server (tx :: txns)
The transaction script is packaged as a value of the contextual monadic type introduced in Sec-
tion 5. For instance, the transaction Q is packaged as {xT ← Q} : {1} = tx_code. The bc−server
process receives this code, spawns a process corresponding to it and waits for the transaction
to terminate (line 5). Note that the transaction is required to terminate with a (close xT) mes-
sage which matches with the (wait xT) being executed by the server, ensuring the execution
order of the transactions. Finally, the latest transaction is added to the queue of transactions
txns : type tx_queue = list tx_code, and the bc−server process recurses.
A transaction can either update the state of existing contracts, or create new ones. In the former
case, it acquires the contracts it wishes to interact with, followed by an update in the contracts’
internal state and releases them. Since the contract types are equi-synchronizing, they remain
unchanged at the end of transaction execution. This ensures that the subsequent transactions
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can access the same contracts at the same type. In the future we plan to allow sub-synchronizing
types that enable a client to release a contract channel not at the same type, but a subtype. The
subtype can then describe the phase of the contract. For instance, the ended phase of auction
contract will be a subtype of the running phase. In the latter case, new contracts are added to the
blockchain state, making them visible in the type of the configuration for subsequent transactions
to access. Thus, in either case, the blockchain state remains well-formed between transactions. A
successful execution of a transaction will lead to the bc−server process recursing and accepting
further transactions.
Concurrent execution of transactions is missing from blockchain systems today [Herlihy 2019].
To reconstruct the blockchain state, each miner must re-execute every transaction sequentially;
simply executing them in parallel is unsafe when contracts depend on each other. However, Nomos
naturally has a concurrent semantics, and we can support concurrent transactions with a slight
modification to the tx_interface type. One caveat is that we need to ensure deterministic execu-
tion of a transaction. The only source of non-determinism in the Nomos semantics is the acquire-
accept pair. A contract executing an accept can attach with any process that tries to acquire it.
One approach to resolve this non-determinism is record-and-replay [Lidbury and Donaldson 2019;
Ronsse and De Bosschere 1999]. The miner records the order in which the contracts are acquired
in the ledger, which is then replayed by others to compute the current blockchain state. Another
promising approach is speculation [Dickerson et al. 2017] where transactions are executed in par-
allel and their read and write sets are tracked. If there is a conflict in these sets, then they are
sequentialized and this schedule is repeated by validators. This speculative technique is known to
provide speed-ups to the overall throughput of the blockchain system [Saraph and Herlihy 2019].
When selecting a request, a miner first creates a configuration, and then type checks the trans-
action script Q against its submitted type information and the existing types of the contracts
C1, . . . ,Cn and the server process. If type checking were too costly here, that can lead to yet an-
other source of denial-of-service attacks. In Nomos however, since the type of transaction script
is provided by the programmer, this form of bi-directional type checking is linear time in the size
of the script. The gas cost of the transaction is statically bounded by the potential given by q and
Ψ. If we allow amortization then the potential in the contracts Ci ’s is also available to cover the
gas cost. This internal potential is not available to the user but can only be accessed according to
the protocol that is given in the contract session type.
Miner’s Transaction Fee. Mining rewards in blockchains like Ethereum are realized by special
transactions that transfer coins to the miner at the beginning of a block. In Nomos, such a transac-
tion could, for example, be represented by an interaction with a specialmining reward contract that
sends linear coins to every client who requests them. Like in Ethereum, a block with transactions
is only valid if only the first transaction interacts with the reward contract. This can be ensured
by the miner with a dynamic check or statically by removing the reward contract from the list of
available contracts before executing user transactions.
Deadlocks. The only language specific reason a transaction can fail is a deadlock in the trans-
action code. Our progress theorem accounts for the possibility of deadlocks. Deadlocks may arise
due to cyclic interdependencies on the contracts that a transaction attempts to acquire. While
it is of course desirable to rule out deadlocks, we felt that this is orthogonal to the design of
Nomos. Any extensions for shared session types that prevent deadlocks (e.g., [Balzer et al. 2019])
will be readily transferable to our setting. Another possibility is to employ dynamic deadlock de-
tection [Chandy et al. 1983; Mitchell and Merritt 1984] and abort the transaction if a deadlock is
detected.
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10 RELATED WORK
We classify the related work into 3 categories - i) new programming languages for smart contracts,
ii) static analysis techniques for existing languages and bytecode, and iii) session-typed and type-
based resource analysis systems technically related to Nomos.
Smart Contract Languages. Existing smart contracts on Ethereum are predominantly imple-
mented in Solidity [Auc 2016], a statically typed object-oriented language influenced by Python
and Javascript. However, the language provides no information about the resource usage of a
contract. Languages like Vyper [Vyp 2018] address resource usage by disallowing recursion and
infinite-length loops, thus making estimation of gas usage decidable. However, both languages still
suffer from re-entrancy vulnerabilities. Bamboo [Bam 2018], on the other hand, makes state tran-
sitions explicit and avoids re-entrance by design. In contrast to our work, none of these languages
use linear type systems to track assets stored in a contract.
Domain specific languages have also been designed for other blockchains apart from Ethereum.
Typecoin [Crary and Sullivan 2015] uses affine logic to solve the peer-to-peer affine commitment
problem using a generalization of Bitcoin where transactions deal in types rather than numbers. Al-
though Typecoin does not provide a mechanism for expressing protocols, it also uses a linear type
system to prevent resources from being discarded or duplicated. Rholang [Rho 2018] is formally
modeled by the ρ-calculus, a reflective higher-order extension of the π -calculus. Michelson [Mic
2018] is a purely functional stack-based language that has no side effects. Scilla [Sergey et al. 2019]
is an intermediate-level language where contracts are structured as communicating automata pro-
viding a continuation-passing style computational model to the language semantics. However,
none of these languages describe and enforce communication protocols statically.
Static Analysis. Analysis of smart contracts has received substantial attention recently due to
their security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious users. KEVM [Hildenbrandt et al.
2018] creates a program verifier based on reachability logic that given an EVM program and
specification, tries to automatically prove the corresponding reachability theorems. However, the
verifier requires significant manual intervention, both in specification and proof construction.
Oyente [Luu et al. 2016] is a symbolic execution tool that checks for 4 kinds of security bugs
in smart contracts, transaction-order dependence, timestamp dependence, mishandled exceptions
and re-entrancy vulnerabilities. MadMax [Grech et al. 2018] automatically detects gas-focused vul-
nerabilities with high confidence. The analysis is based on a decompiler that extracts control and
data flow information from EVM bytecode, and a logic-based analysis specification that produces
a high-level program model. Bhargavan et al. [2016] translate Ethereum contracts to F* to prove
runtime safety and functional correctness, although they do not support all syntactic features.
VeriSol [Lahiri et al. 2018] is a highly-automated formal verifier for Solidity that can produce
proofs as well as counterexamples and proves semantic conformance of smart contracts against a
state machine model with access-control policy. However, in contrast to Nomos, where guarantees
are proved by a soundness proof of the type system, static analysis techniques often do not explore
all program paths, can report false positives that need to be manually filtered, and miss bugs due
to timeouts and other sources of incompleteness.
Session types and Resource analysis. Session types were introduced by Honda [Honda 1993]
as a typed formalism for inter-process dyadic interaction. They have been integrated into a func-
tional language in prior work [Toninho et al. 2013]. However, this integration does not account for
resource usage or sharing. Sharing in session types has also been explored in priorwork [Balzer and Pfenning
2017], but with the strong restriction that shared processes cannot rely on linear resources that we
lift in Nomos. Shared session types were also never integrated with a functional layer or tracked
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for resource usage. While we consider binary session types that express local interactions, global
protocols can be expressed using multi-party session types [Honda et al. 2008; Scalas and Yoshida
2019]. Automatic amortized resource analysis (AARA) has been introduced as a type system to
derive linear [Hofmann and Jost 2003] and polynomial bounds [Hoffmann et al. 2017] for func-
tional programming languages. Resource usage has also previously been explored separately for
the purely linear process layer [Das et al. 2018], but were never combined with shared session
types or integrated with the functional layer.
11 CONCLUSION
We have described the programming language Nomos, its type-theoretic foundation, a prototype
implementation and evaluated its feasibility on several real world smart contract applications.
Nomos builds on linear logic, shared session types, and automatic amortized resource analysis to
address the challenges that programmers are faced with when implementing digital contracts. Our
main contributions are the design and implementation of Nomos’ multi-layered resource-aware
type system and its type soundness proof.
In future work, we plan to explore refinement session types for expressing and verifying func-
tional correctness of contracts against their specifications and to target open questions regarding
a blockchain integration. These include the exact cost model, fluctuation of gas prices, and poten-
tial compilation to a lower-level language. Since Nomos has a concurrent semantics, we also plan
to support parallel execution of transactions using speculation techniques [Saraph and Herlihy
2019].
A OVERVIEW
This appendix supplements the tech report “Resource-Aware Session Types for Digital Contracts”.
The main contributions of the appendix are as follows.
• Appendix B presents the Nomos code for standard smart contract applications.
• Appendix C presents the type grammar.
• Appendix D presents the process typing rules, concerning the judgment Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P ::
(xm : A). This judgment types a process in state P providing service of type A along channel
x at modem. Moreover, the process uses functional variables from Ψ, shared channels from
Γ and linear channels from ∆. Finally, the process stores potential q.
• Appendix E presents the rules of the operational cost semantics. These discuss the behavior
of the semantic objects proc(cm,w, P) and msg(cm ,w,N ) defining a process P (or message
N ) offering along channel c at modem which has performed workw so far.
• Appendix F presents the rules corresponding to configuration typing and other helper judg-
ments. The configuration typing judgment Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆) describes a well-typed configu-
ration Ω which offers shared channels in Γ and linear channels in ∆.
• Appendix G is the main contribution of the supplementary material. It presents and proves
the main theorem of type safety of our language. This is split into a type preservation and
a progress theorem. The appendix also proves the lemmas necessary for the type safety
theorems.
B IMPLEMENTATION OF SMART CONTRACT APPLICATIONS IN NOMOS
B.1 Auction
type money = &{ value : <{2}| int ^ money,
coins : <{0}| lcoin }
type lcoin = 1
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proc asset emp : . |{1}- ($l[R] : lcoin) =
{
work ;
close $l[R]
}
proc asset empty_wallet : . |{3}- ($m[R] : money) =
{
$l[R] <- emp <- ;
work ;
let n = (tick ; 0) ;
$m[R] <- wallet <- n $l[R]
}
proc asset wallet : (n : int), ($l[R] : lcoin) |- ($m[R] : money) =
{
case $m[R] ( value => get $m[R] {2};
work ;
send $m[R] ((tick ; n)) ;
$m[R] <- wallet <- n $l[R]
| coins => get $m[R] {0};
$m[R] <- $l[R] )
}
type dictionary = &{ add : <{5}| int -> money -o[R] dictionary,
delete : <{6}| int -> money *[R] dictionary,
check : <{4}| int -> bool ^ dictionary,
size : <{2}| int ^ dictionary }
proc asset dummy : (n : int) |- ($d[R] : dictionary) =
{
case $d[R] ( add => get $d[R] {5};
key = recv $d[R] ;
work ;
$v[R] <- recv $d[R] ;
$v[R].coins ;
pay $v[R] {0};
work ;
wait $v[R] ;
let n = (tick ; (tick ; n) + (tick ; 1)) ;
$d[R] <- dummy <- n
| delete => get $d[R] {6};
key = recv $d[R] ;
$v[R] <- empty_wallet <- ;
send $d[R] $v[R] ;
let n = (tick ; (tick ; n) - (tick ; 1)) ;
$d[R] <- dummy <- n
| check => get $d[R] {4};
key = recv $d[R] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; key) > (tick ; 0))
then
send $d[R] ((tick ; true)) ;
$d[R] <- dummy <- n
else
send $d[R] ((tick ; false)) ;
$d[R] <- dummy <- n
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| size => get $d[R] {2};
work ;
send $d[R] ((tick ; n)) ;
$d[R] <- dummy <- n )
}
type lot = 1
proc asset addbid : (r : int), ($m[R] : money), ($bs[R] : dictionary)
|{8}- ($newbs[R] : dictionary) =
{
work ;
$bs[R].add ;
pay $bs[R] {5};
work ;
send $bs[R] ((tick ; r)) ;
send $bs[R] $m[R] ;
$newbs[R] <- $bs[R]
}
type auction = /\ <{22}|
+{ running : &{ bid : int -> money -o[R] |{0}> \/ auction,
cancel : |{21}> \/ auction },
ended : &{ collect : int -> +{ won : lot *[R] |{0}> \/ auction,
lost : money *[R] |{7}> \/ auction },
cancel : |{21}> \/ auction } }
proc contract run : (T : int), (w : int), (v : int),
($b[R] : dictionary), ($l[R] : lot)
|- (#sa[S] : auction) =
{
$la[L] <- accept #sa[S] ;
get $la[L] {22};
work ;
$la[L].running ;
case $la[L] ( bid => r = recv $la[L] ;
work ;
$m[R] <- recv $la[L] ;
pay $la[L] {0};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
$m[R].value ;
pay $m[R] {2};
work ;
bv = recv $m[R] ;
$newb[R] <- addbid <- r $m[R] $b[R] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; bv) > (tick ; v))
then
#sa[S] <- check <- T r bv $newb[R] $l[R]
else
#sa[S] <- check <- T w v $newb[R] $l[R]
| cancel => pay $la[L] {21};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
#sa[S] <- run <- T w v $b[R] $l[R] )
}
proc contract check : (T : int), (w : int), (v : int),
($b[R] : dictionary), ($l[R] : lot)
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|{6}- (#sa[S] : auction) =
{
work ;
$b[R].size ;
pay $b[R] {2};
n = recv $b[R] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; n) = (tick ; T))
then
#sa[S] <- end_lot <- T w $b[R] $l[R]
else
#sa[S] <- run <- T w v $b[R] $l[R]
}
proc asset removebid : (r : int), ($bs[R] : dictionary)
|{10}- ($newbs[R] : money *[R] dictionary) =
{
work ;
$bs[R].delete ;
pay $bs[R] {6};
work ;
send $bs[R] ((tick ; r)) ;
work ;
$m[R] <- recv $bs[R] ;
send $newbs[R] $m[R] ;
$newbs[R] <- $bs[R]
}
proc contract end_lot : (T : int), (w : int),
($b[R] : dictionary), ($l[R] : lot)
|- (#sa[S] : auction) =
{
$la[L] <- accept #sa[S] ;
get $la[L] {22};
work ;
$la[L].ended ;
case $la[L] ( collect => r = recv $la[L] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; w) = (tick ; r))
then
$la[L].won ;
send $la[L] $l[R] ;
pay $la[L] {0};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
#sa[S] <- end_nolot <- T w $b[R]
else
$la[L].lost ;
$newb[R] <- removebid <- r $b[R] ;
work ;
$m[R] <- recv $newb[R] ;
send $la[L] $m[R] ;
pay $la[L] {7};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
#sa[S] <- end_lot <- T w $newb[R] $l[R]
| cancel => pay $la[L] {21};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 1, No. CONF, Article 1. Publication date: January 2018.
Resource-Aware Session Types 1:31
#sa[S] <- end_lot <- T w $b[R] $l[R] )
}
proc contract end_nolot : (T : int), (w : int), ($b[R] : dictionary)
|{18}- (#sa[S] : auction) =
{
$la[L] <- accept #sa[S] ;
get $la[L] {22};
work ;
$la[L].ended ;
case $la[L] ( collect => r = recv $la[L] ;
$la[L].lost ;
$newb[R] <- removebid <- r $b[R] ;
work ;
$m[R] <- recv $newb[R] ;
send $la[L] $m[R] ;
pay $la[L] {7};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
work {3};
#sa[S] <- end_nolot <- T w $newb[R]
| cancel => pay $la[L] {21};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
work {0};
#sa[S] <- end_nolot <- T w $b[R] )
}
TC time: 2.0809173584
Inference time: 9.94420051575
# Vars = 229
# Constraints = 730
% compilation successful!
% runtime successful!
B.2 Bank Account
type money = &{ value : <{2}| int ^ money,
coins : <{0}| lcoin,
check_pwd : <{4}| int -> bool ^ money }
type lcoin = 1
proc asset emp : . |{1}- ($l[R] : lcoin) =
{
work ;
close $l[R]
}
proc asset empty_wallet : (pwd : int) |{3}- ($m[R] : money) =
{
$l[R] <- emp <- ;
work ;
let n = (tick ; 0) ;
$m[R] <- wallet <- pwd n $l[R]
}
proc asset wallet : (pwd : int), (n : int), ($l[R] : lcoin) |- ($m[R] : money) =
{
case $m[R] ( value => get $m[R] {2};
work ;
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send $m[R] ((tick ; n)) ;
$m[R] <- wallet <- pwd n $l[R]
| coins => get $m[R] {0};
$m[R] <- $l[R]
| check_pwd => get $m[R] {4};
p = recv $m[R] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; p) = (tick ; pwd))
then
send $m[R] ((tick ; true)) ;
$m[R] <- wallet <- pwd n $l[R]
else
send $m[R] ((tick ; false)) ;
$m[R] <- wallet <- pwd n $l[R] )
}
type dictionary = &{ add : <{5}| int -> money -o[R] dictionary,
delete : <{6}| int -> money *[R] dictionary,
check : <{5}| int -> int -> bool ^ dictionary,
size : <{2}| int ^ dictionary }
proc asset dummy : (n : int) |- ($d[R] : dictionary) =
{
case $d[R] ( add => get $d[R] {5};
key = recv $d[R] ;
work ;
$v[R] <- recv $d[R] ;
$v[R].coins ;
pay $v[R] {0};
work ;
wait $v[R] ;
let n = (tick ; (tick ; n) + (tick ; 1)) ;
$d[R] <- dummy <- n
| delete => get $d[R] {6};
key = recv $d[R] ;
$v[R] <- empty_wallet <- key ;
send $d[R] $v[R] ;
let n = (tick ; (tick ; n) - (tick ; 1)) ;
$d[R] <- dummy <- n
| check => get $d[R] {5};
key = recv $d[R] ;
work ;
pwd = recv $d[R] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; pwd) > (tick ; 0))
then
send $d[R] ((tick ; true)) ;
$d[R] <- dummy <- n
else
send $d[R] ((tick ; false)) ;
$d[R] <- dummy <- n
| size => get $d[R] {2};
work ;
send $d[R] ((tick ; n)) ;
$d[R] <- dummy <- n )
}
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type account = /\ <{29}|
&{ signup : int -> int -> |{19}> \/ account,
login : int -> int ->
+{ failure : |{19}> \/ account,
success : &{ deposit : money -o[R] |{11}> \/ account,
balance : int ^ |{0}> \/ account,
withdraw : int -> money *[R] |{9}> \/ account } } }
proc contract bank : ($accts[R] : dictionary) |- (#sa[S] : account) =
{
$la[L] <- accept #sa[S] ;
get $la[L] {29};
case $la[L] ( signup => id = recv $la[L] ;
work ;
pwd = recv $la[L] ;
$m[R] <- empty_wallet <- pwd ;
$accts[R].add ;
pay $accts[R] {5};
send $accts[R] ((tick ; id)) ;
send $accts[R] $m[R] ;
pay $la[L] {19};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
#sa[S] <- bank <- $accts[R]
| login => id = recv $la[L] ;
work ;
pwd = recv $la[L] ;
$accts[R].check ;
pay $accts[R] {5};
send $accts[R] ((tick ; id)) ;
send $accts[R] ((tick ; pwd)) ;
work ;
r = recv $accts[R] ;
if (tick ; r)
then
$la[L].success ;
work ;
case $la[L]
( deposit => work ;
$m[R] <- recv $la[L] ;
$accts[R].add ;
pay $accts[R] {5};
send $accts[R] ((tick ; id)) ;
send $accts[R] $m[R] ;
pay $la[L] {11};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
#sa[S] <- bank <- $accts[R]
| balance => $accts[R].delete ;
pay $accts[R] {6};
send $accts[R] ((tick ; id)) ;
work ;
$m[R] <- recv $accts[R] ;
$m[R].value ;
pay $m[R] {2};
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work ;
val = recv $m[R] ;
send $la[L] ((tick ; val)) ;
$accts[R].add ;
pay $accts[R] {5};
send $accts[R] ((tick ; id)) ;
send $accts[R] $m[R] ;
pay $la[L] {0};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
#sa[S] <- bank <- $accts[R]
| withdraw => $accts[R].delete ;
pay $accts[R] {6};
send $accts[R] ((tick ; id)) ;
work ;
v = recv $la[L] ;
work ;
$m[R] <- recv $accts[R] ;
send $la[L] $m[R] ;
pay $la[L] {9};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
#sa[S] <- bank <- $accts[R] )
else
$la[L].failure ;
pay $la[L] {19};
#sa[S] <- detach $la[L] ;
#sa[S] <- bank <- $accts[R] )
}
TC time: 0.648975372314
Inference time: 4.99391555786
# Vars = 173
# Constraints = 561
% compilation successful!
% runtime successful!
B.3 ERC-20 Token
type money = &{ add : <{8}| money -o[R] money,
subtract : <{6}| int -> +{ sufficient : money *[R] money,
insufficient : money },
value : <{2}| int ^ money,
coins : <| 1 }
proc asset wallet : (n : int) |- ($m[R] : money) =
{
case $m[R] ( add => get $m[R] {8};
$m1[R] <- recv $m[R] ;
work ;
$m1[R].value ;
pay $m1[R] {2};
n1 = recv $m1[R] ;
$m1[R].coins ;
pay $m1[R] ;
work ;
wait $m1[R] ;
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let n = (tick ; (tick ; n) + (tick ; n1)) ;
$m[R] <- wallet <- n
| subtract => get $m[R] {6};
n1 = recv $m[R] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; n) > (tick ; n1))
then
$m[R].sufficient ;
$m1[R] <- wallet <- n1 ;
send $m[R] $m1[R] ;
let n = (tick ; (tick ; n) - (tick ; n1)) ;
work {0};
$m[R] <- wallet <- n
else
$m[R].insufficient ;
work {3};
$m[R] <- wallet <- n
| value => get $m[R] {2};
work ;
send $m[R] ((tick ; n)) ;
$m[R] <- wallet <- n
| coins => get $m[R] ;
work ;
close $m[R] )
}
type erc20token = /\ <{11}|
&{ totalSupply : int ^ |{9}> \/ erc20token,
balanceOf : int -> int ^ |{8}> \/ erc20token,
transfer : int -> int -> int -> |{0}> \/ erc20token,
transferFrom : int -> int -> int -> |{0}> \/ erc20token,
approve : int -> int -> int -> |{6}> \/ erc20token,
allowance : int -> int -> int ^ |{6}> \/ erc20token }
type balance_dict = &{ get_balance : int -> int ^ balance_dict,
transfer : int -> int -> int -> balance_dict }
type allowance_dict = &{ get_allowance : int -> int -> int ^ allowance_dict,
set_allowance : int -> int -> int -> allowance_dict }
proc contract erc20contract : ($allows[R] : allowance_dict),
($bals[R] : balance_dict), (N : int)
|- (#se[S] : erc20token) =
{
$le[L] <- accept #se[S] ;
get $le[L] {11};
case $le[L] ( totalSupply => work ;
send $le[L] ((tick ; N)) ;
pay $le[L] {9};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
#se[S] <- erc20contract <- $allows[R] $bals[R] N
| balanceOf => addr = recv $le[L] ;
$bals[R].get_balance ;
send $bals[R] ((tick ; addr)) ;
work ;
val = recv $bals[R] ;
send $le[L] ((tick ; val)) ;
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pay $le[L] {8};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
#se[S] <- erc20contract <- $allows[R] $bals[R] N
| transfer => from = recv $le[L] ;
work ;
to = recv $le[L] ;
work ;
amt = recv $le[L] ;
$allows[R].get_allowance ;
send $allows[R] ((tick ; from)) ;
send $allows[R] ((tick ; to)) ;
work ;
allowance = recv $allows[R] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; amt) > (tick ; allowance))
then
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work {3};
#se[S] <- erc20contract <- $allows[R] $bals[R] N
else
$bals[R].transfer ;
send $bals[R] ((tick ; from)) ;
send $bals[R] ((tick ; to)) ;
send $bals[R] ((tick ; amt)) ;
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work {0};
#se[S] <- erc20contract <- $allows[R] $bals[R] N
| transferFrom => from = recv $le[L] ;
work ;
to = recv $le[L] ;
work ;
amt = recv $le[L] ;
$allows[R].get_allowance ;
send $allows[R] ((tick ; from)) ;
send $allows[R] ((tick ; to)) ;
work ;
allowance = recv $allows[R] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; amt) > (tick ; allowance))
then
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work {3};
#se[S] <- erc20contract <- $allows[R] $bals[R] N
else
$bals[R].transfer ;
send $bals[R] ((tick ; from)) ;
send $bals[R] ((tick ; to)) ;
send $bals[R] ((tick ; amt)) ;
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work {0};
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#se[S] <- erc20contract <- $allows[R] $bals[R] N
| approve => from = recv $le[L] ;
work ;
to = recv $le[L] ;
work ;
allowance = recv $le[L] ;
$allows[R].set_allowance ;
send $allows[R] ((tick ; from)) ;
send $allows[R] ((tick ; to)) ;
send $allows[R] ((tick ; allowance)) ;
pay $le[L] {6};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
#se[S] <- erc20contract <- $allows[R] $bals[R] N
| allowance => from = recv $le[L] ;
work ;
to = recv $le[L] ;
$allows[R].get_allowance ;
send $allows[R] ((tick ; from)) ;
send $allows[R] ((tick ; to)) ;
work ;
allowance = recv $allows[R] ;
send $le[L] ((tick ; allowance)) ;
pay $le[L] {6};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
#se[S] <- erc20contract <- $allows[R] $bals[R] N )
}
TC time: 1.89590454102
Inference time: 4.7709941864
# Vars = 161
# Constraints = 561
% compilation successful!
% runtime successful!
B.4 Escrow
type escrow = /\ <{7}| &{ approve : int -> |{0}> \/ escrow,
cancel : int -> |{0}> \/ escrow,
deposit : int -> bond -o[R] |{4}> \/ escrow,
withdraw : int -> bond *[R] |{0}> \/ escrow }
type bond = 1
proc asset emp : . |{1}- ($l[R] : bond) =
{
work ;
close $l[R]
}
proc contract escrow_con : (buyer : int), (seller : int),
(buyerOk : bool), (sellerOk : bool),
($l[R] : bond)
|- (#se[S] : escrow) =
{
$le[L] <- accept #se[S] ;
get $le[L] {7};
case $le[L]
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( approve =>
r = recv $le[L] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; r) = (tick ; buyer))
then
let buyerOk = (tick ; true) ;
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work {3};
#se[S] <- escrow_con <- buyer seller buyerOk sellerOk $l[R]
else
if (tick ; (tick ; r) = (tick ; seller))
then
let sellerOk = (tick ; true) ;
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work {0};
#se[S] <- escrow_con <- buyer seller buyerOk sellerOk $l[R]
else
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work ;
#se[S] <- escrow_con <- buyer seller buyerOk sellerOk $l[R]
| cancel =>
r = recv $le[L] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; r) = (tick ; buyer))
then
let buyerOk = (tick ; false) ;
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work {3};
#se[S] <- escrow_con <- buyer seller buyerOk sellerOk $l[R]
else
if (tick ; (tick ; r) = (tick ; seller))
then
let sellerOk = (tick ; false) ;
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work {0};
#se[S] <- escrow_con <- buyer seller buyerOk sellerOk $l[R]
else
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work ;
#se[S] <- escrow_con <- buyer seller buyerOk sellerOk $l[R]
| deposit =>
r = recv $le[L] ;
work ;
$m[R] <- recv $le[L] ;
let seller = (tick ; r) ;
pay $le[L] {4};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work ;
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wait $m[R] ;
work {0};
#se[S] <- escrow_con <- buyer seller buyerOk sellerOk $l[R]
| withdraw =>
r = recv $le[L] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; r) = (tick ; buyer))
then
send $le[L] $l[R] ;
$l[R] <- emp <- ;
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work {3};
#se[S] <- escrow_con <- buyer seller buyerOk sellerOk $l[R]
else
$m[R] <- emp <- ;
send $le[L] $m[R] ;
pay $le[L] {0};
#se[S] <- detach $le[L] ;
work {3};
#se[S] <- escrow_con <- buyer seller buyerOk sellerOk $l[R] )
}
TC time: 1.9428730011
Inference time: 5.47099113464
# Vars = 95
# Constraints = 321
% compilation successful!
% runtime successful!
B.5 Insurance
type insurance = /\ <{6}|
&{ submit : int -> +{ success : money *[R] |{0}> \/ insurance,
failure : |> \/ insurance } }
type verifier = /\ <{3}| &{ verify : int -> +{ valid : |{0}> \/ verifier,
invalid : |{0}> \/ verifier } }
proc contract verify : . |- (#sv[S] : verifier) =
{
$lv[L] <- accept #sv[S] ;
get $lv[L] {3};
case $lv[L] ( verify => claim = recv $lv[L] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; claim) > (tick ; 0))
then
$lv[L].valid ;
pay $lv[L] {0};
#sv[S] <- detach $lv[L] ;
#sv[S] <- verify <-
else
$lv[L].invalid ;
pay $lv[L] {0};
#sv[S] <- detach $lv[L] ;
#sv[S] <- verify <- )
}
type money = &{ subtract : money *[R] money }
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proc contract insurer : (#sv[S] : verifier), ($m[R] : money)
|- (#si[S] : insurance) =
{
$li[L] <- accept #si[S] ;
get $li[L] {6};
case $li[L] ( submit => claim = recv $li[L] ;
$lv[L] <- acquire #sv[S] ;
pay $lv[L] {3};
$lv[L].verify ;
send $lv[L] ((tick ; claim)) ;
work ;
case $lv[L]
( valid => get $lv[L] {0};
$li[L].success ;
$m[R].subtract ;
work ;
$r[R] <- recv $m[R] ;
send $li[L] $r[R] ;
pay $li[L] {0};
#sv[S] <- release $lv[L] ;
#si[S] <- detach $li[L] ;
#si[S] <- insurer <- #sv[S] $m[R]
| invalid => get $lv[L] {0};
#li[L].failure ;
pay $li[L] ;
#sv[S] <- release $lv[L] ;
#si[S] <- detach $li[L] ;
#si[S] <- insurer <- #sv[S] $m[R] ) )
}
TC time: 1.36709213257
Inference time: 3.58390808105
# Vars = 76
# Constraints = 224
% compilation successful!
% runtime successful!
B.6 Puzzle
type puzzle = /\ <{14}|
&{ update : int -> money -o[R] |{0}> \/ puzzle,
submit : int ^ &{ success : int -> money *[R] |{5}> \/ puzzle,
failure : |{9}> \/ puzzle } }
type money = &{ value : <{2}| int ^ money,
coins : <{0}| lcoin }
type lcoin = 1
proc asset join : ($m[R] : lcoin), ($n[R] : lcoin) |{1}- ($o[R] : lcoin) =
{
wait $m[R] ;
wait $n[R] ;
work ;
close $o[R]
}
proc asset consume : ($m[R] : money) |{1}- ($o[R] : 1) =
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{
work ;
$m[R].coins ;
pay $m[R] {0};
$o[R] <- $m[R]
}
proc asset add : ($m[R] : money), ($n[R] : money) |{10}- ($o[R] : money) =
{
work ;
$m[R].value ;
pay $m[R] {2};
mval = recv $m[R] ;
$n[R].value ;
pay $n[R] {2};
work ;
nval = recv $n[R] ;
let oval = (tick ; (tick ; mval) + (tick ; nval)) ;
$m[R].coins ;
pay $m[R] {0};
$n[R].coins ;
pay $n[R] {0};
$ocoin[R] <- join <- $m[R] $n[R] ;
$o[R] <- wallet <- oval $ocoin[R]
}
proc asset wallet : (n : int), ($l[R] : lcoin) |- ($m[R] : money) =
{
case $m[R] ( value => get $m[R] {2};
work ;
send $m[R] ((tick ; n)) ;
$m[R] <- wallet <- n $l[R]
| coins => get $m[R] {0};
$m[R] <- $l[R] )
}
proc asset emp : . |{1}- ($l[R] : lcoin) =
{
work ;
close $l[R]
}
proc asset empty_wallet : . |{3}- ($m[R] : money) =
{
$l[R] <- emp <- ;
work ;
let n = (tick ; 0) ;
$m[R] <- wallet <- n $l[R]
}
proc contract game : (addr : int), ($m[R] : money) |- (#sp[S] : puzzle) =
{
$lp[L] <- accept #sp[S] ;
get $lp[L] {14};
case $lp[L] ( update => n = recv $lp[L] ;
work ;
$r[R] <- recv $lp[L] ;
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if (tick ; (tick ; n) = (tick ; addr))
then
$newm[R] <- add <- $m[R] $r[R] ;
pay $lp[L] {0};
#sp[S] <- detach $lp[L] ;
#sp[S] <- game <- addr $newm[R]
else
$tmp[R] <- consume <- $r[R] ;
work ;
wait $tmp[R] ;
pay $lp[L] {0};
#sp[S] <- detach $lp[L] ;
work {8};
#sp[S] <- game <- addr $m[R]
| submit => work ;
$m[R].value ;
pay $m[R] {2};
mval = recv $m[R] ;
send $lp[L] ((tick ; mval)) ;
work ;
case $lp[L]
( success => work ;
sol = recv $lp[L] ;
send $lp[L] $m[R] ;
pay $lp[L] {5};
#sp[S] <- detach $lp[L] ;
$emp[R] <- empty_wallet <- ;
#sp[S] <- game <- addr $emp[R]
| failure => pay $lp[L] {9};
#sp[S] <- detach $lp[L] ;
#sp[S] <- game <- addr $m[R] ) )
}
TC time: 1.64389610291
Inference time: 4.714012146
# Vars = 126
# Constraints = 389
% compilation successful!
% runtime successful!
B.7 Amortized Voting
type ballot = /\ <{16}| +{ open : int -> +{ vote : int -> |{0}> \/ ballot,
novote : |{9}> \/ ballot },
closed : int ^ |{13}> \/ ballot }
type vote_list = +{ cons : |{4}> vote_list,
nil : 1 }
proc asset cons : ($t[P] : vote_list) |{5}- ($l[P] : vote_list) =
{
work ;
$l[P].cons ;
pay $l[P] {4};
$l[P] <- $t[P]
}
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type voters = &{ check : <{0}| int -> +{ success : voters,
failure : voters },
size : <{0}| int ^ voters }
proc contract open_election : (T : int), ($vs[P] : voters),
($c1[P] : vote_list), ($c2[P] : vote_list)
|{14}- (#sb[S] : ballot) =
{
$lb[L] <- accept #sb[S] ;
get $lb[L] {16};
work ;
$lb[L].open ;
v = recv $lb[L] ;
$vs[P].check ;
pay $vs[P] {0};
send $vs[P] ((tick ; v)) ;
work ;
case $vs[P] ( success => $lb[L].vote ;
work ;
c = recv $lb[L] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; c) > (tick ; 0))
then
$c1n[P] <- cons <- $c1[P] ;
pay $lb[L] {0};
#sb[S] <- detach $lb[L] ;
#sb[S] <- check <- T $vs[P] $c1n[P] $c2[P]
else
$c2n[P] <- cons <- $c2[P] ;
pay $lb[L] {0};
#sb[S] <- detach $lb[L] ;
#sb[S] <- check <- T $vs[P] $c1[P] $c2n[P]
| failure => $lb[L].novote ;
pay $lb[L] {9};
#sb[S] <- detach $lb[L] ;
#sb[S] <- check <- T $vs[P] $c1[P] $c2[P] )
}
proc asset count_helper : (n : int), ($c[P] : vote_list) |{2}- ($s[P] : int ^ 1) =
{
case $c[P] ( cons => get $c[P] {4};
work ;
let n = (tick ; (tick ; n) + (tick ; 1)) ;
$s[P] <- count_helper <- n $c[P]
| nil => wait $c[P] ;
work ;
send $s[P] ((tick ; n)) ;
close $s[P] )
}
proc asset count_list : ($c[P] : vote_list) |{4}- ($s[P] : int ^ 1) =
{
work ;
let n = (tick ; 0) ;
$s[P] <- count_helper <- n $c[P]
}
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proc contract count : (T : int), ($vs[P] : voters),
($c1[P] : vote_list), ($c2[P] : vote_list)
|{14}- (#sb[S] : ballot) =
{
$s1[P] <- count_list <- $c1[P] ;
$s2[P] <- count_list <- $c2[P] ;
s1 = recv $s1[P] ;
work ;
s2 = recv $s2[P] ;
work ;
wait $s1[P] ;
work ;
wait $s2[P] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; s1) > (tick ; s2))
then
#sb[S] <- closed_election <- s1 $vs[P]
else
#sb[S] <- closed_election <- s2 $vs[P]
}
proc contract check : (T : int), ($vs[P] : voters),
($c1[P] : vote_list), ($c2[P] : vote_list)
|{18}- (#sb[S] : ballot) =
{
work ;
$vs[P].size ;
pay $vs[P] {0};
n = recv $vs[P] ;
if (tick ; (tick ; n) = (tick ; T))
then
#sb[S] <- count <- T $vs[P] $c1[P] $c2[P]
else
#sb[S] <- open_election <- T $vs[P] $c1[P] $c2[P]
}
proc contract closed_election : (w : int), ($vs[P] : voters)
|- (#sb[S] : ballot) =
{
$lb[L] <- accept #sb[S] ;
get $lb[L] {16};
work ;
$lb[L].closed ;
work ;
send $lb[L] ((tick ; w)) ;
pay $lb[L] {13};
#sb[S] <- detach $lb[L] ;
#sb[S] <- closed_election <- w $vs[P]
}
TC time: 0.34499168396
Inference time: 11.1479759216
# Vars = 140
# Constraints = 457
% compilation successful!
% runtime successful!
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B.8 Wallet
type coin = 1
type lcoin = +{ cons : coin *[R] lcoin,
nil : 1 }
type money = /\ &{ value : <{2}| int ^ \/ money,
coins : <{5}| lcoin *[R] \/ money }
proc asset emp : . |{2}- ($l[R] : lcoin) =
{
work ;
$l[R].nil ;
work ;
close $l[R]
}
proc contract wallet : (n : int), ($l[R] : lcoin) |- (#sm[S] : money) =
{
$m[L] <- accept #sm[S] ;
case $m[L] ( value => get $m[L] {2};
work ;
send $m[L] ((tick ; n)) ;
work {0};
#sm[S] <- detach $m[L] ;
#sm[S] <- wallet <- n $l[R]
| coins => get $m[L] {5};
work {0};
work ;
send $m[L] $l[R] ;
$l[R] <- emp <- ;
work ;
let n = (tick ; 0) ;
#sm[S] <- detach $m[L] ;
#sm[S] <- wallet <- n $l[R] )
}
TC time: 0.217914581299
Inference time: 6.70695304871
# Vars = 32
# Constraints = 102
% compilation successful!
% runtime successful!
C TYPES
First, I present the grammar for ordinary functional types τ with potential.
τ ::= t | τ → τ | τ + τ | τ × τ
| int | bool | Lq(τ )
| {AR ← AR}R | {AS ← AS ; AR}S | {AT ← AS ; A}T
Next, I define the purely linear session types.
AR ::= V | ⊕{ℓ : AR}ℓ∈L | N{ℓ : AR}ℓ∈L | Am ⊸m AR | Am ⊗m AR | 1
| τ → AR | τ ×AR | ⊲
rAR | ⊳
rAR
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Next, the shared linear session types.
AL ::= V | ⊕{ℓ : AL}ℓ∈L | N{ℓ : AL}ℓ∈L | Am ⊸m AL | Am ⊗m AL
| τ → AL | τ ×AL | ⊲
rAL | ⊳
rAL
| ↓S
L
AS
Finally, the shared session type.
AS ::= ↑
S
L AL
The client linear types follow the same grammar as purely linear types. The combined type is
represented using A which denotes the type of either a client or contract process in linear mode.
AT ::= AR
A ::= AT | AL
First, the expressions at the functional layer are as follows (usual terms from a functional language).
M ,N ::= λx : τ .Mx | M N
| l ·M | r ·M | case M (l ֒→ Ml , r ֒→ Mr )
| 〈M ,N 〉 | M · l | M · r
| n | true | false
| [] | M :: N | match M ([] → M1, x :: xs → M2)
| {cR ← PcR,a ← a} | {cS ← PcS,a,d
← a ; d} | {cT ← PcT,a,b ← a ; b}
The processes (proof terms) are as follows.
P,Q ::= c ← M ← a ; Pc spawn process computed by M and continue with
Pa , both communicating along fresh channel a
| x ← y forward between x and y
| x .lk ; P send label lk along x
| case x (li ⇒ P) branch on received label along x
| send x w ; P send channel/valuew along x
| y ← recv x ; P receive channel/value along x and bind it to y
| close x close channel x
| wait x ; P wait on closing channel x
| work {p} ; P do work p, continue with P
| get x {p} ; P get potential p on channel x
| pay x {p} ; P pay potential p on channel x
| xL ← acquire xS ; PxL send an acquire request along xS
| xL ← accept xS ; PxL accept an acquire request along xS
| xS ← detach xL ; PxS send a detach request along xL
| xS ← release xL ; PxS receive a detach request along xL
D TYPE SYSTEM
We first define the judgments we use in our type system.
Ψ 
q
M : τ termM has type τ
and needs potential q for evaluation
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (cm : A) process P offers service of type A
along channel c at modem = (S, L, T,R)
and uses shared channels from Γ
and linear channels from ∆
and functional variables from Ψ
and stores potential q
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Mode S stands for channels in sharedmode.Mode L stands for shared channels in their linear mode.
Mode T stands for linear channels that internally depend on shared processes. Mode R stands for
purely linear channels offered by purely linear processes.
D.1 Monad
First, I present the rules concerning the monad.
Introduction Rules.
∆ = dR : DR Ψ ; · ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xR : AR)
Ψ 
q
{xR ← P ← dR} : {AR ← DR}R
{}IR
Γ = aS : AS ∆ = dR : DR Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xS : A)
Ψ 
q
{xS ← P ← aS ; dR} : {A ← AS ; DR}S
{}IS
Γ = aS : AS ∆ = d : D Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xT : A)
Ψ 
q
{xT ← P ← aS ; d} : {A ← AS ; D}T
{}IT
Elimination Rules.
r = p + q ∆ = dR : DR Ψ . (Ψ1,Ψ2)
Ψ1 
p
M : {A ← DR}R Ψ2 ; Γ ; ∆
′
, (xR : A) ⊢
q
Q :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆,∆′ ⊢
r
xR ← M ← dR ; Q :: (zm : C)
{}ERm(∈{R,S,L,T})
r = p + q Γ ⊇ aS : AS ∆ = dR : DR (AS,AS) esync Ψ . (Ψ1,Ψ2)
Ψ1 
p
M : {A ← AS ; DR}S Ψ2 ; Γ, (xS : A) ; ∆
′ ⊢
q
Q :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆,∆′ ⊢
r
xS ← M ← dR ; Q :: (zm : C)
{}ESm(∈{S,L,T})
r = p + q Γ ⊇ aS : AS ∆ = d : D Ψ . (Ψ1,Ψ2)
Ψ1 
p
M : {A ← AS ; D}T Ψ2 ; Γ ; (xT : A),∆
′ ⊢
q
Q :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆,∆′ ⊢
r
xT ← M ← aS ; d ; Q :: (zm : C)
{}ETm(∈{L,T})
The rest of the rules for expressions in the functional layer are standard. We skip them and
discuss the process layer.
D.2 Forwarding
q = 0
Ψ ; Γ ; (ym : A) ⊢
q
xm ← ym :: (xm : A)
fwdm(∈{R,T})
D.3 Labels and Branching
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : Ak ) (k ∈ L)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
xm .k ; P :: (xm : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L)
⊕R
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : Aℓ) ⊢
q
Qℓ :: (zk : C) (∀ℓ ∈ L)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L) ⊢
q
case xm (ℓ ⇒ Qℓ)ℓ∈L :: (zk : C)
⊕L
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : Aℓ) (∀ℓ ∈ L)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
case xm (ℓ ⇒ Pℓ)ℓ∈L :: (xm : N{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L)
NR
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Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : Aℓ) ⊢
q
Qℓ :: (zk : C) (k ∈ L)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : N{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L) ⊢
q
xm .k ; P :: (zk : C)
NL
D.4 Linear Channel Communication
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : B)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (wn : A) ⊢
q
send xm wn ; P :: (xm : A ⊗n B)
⊗nR
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (yn : A), (xm : B) ⊢
q
Q :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : A ⊗n B) ⊢
q
yn ← recv xm ; Q :: (zk : C)
⊗nL
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (yn : A) ⊢
q
P :: (xm : B)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
yn ← recv xm ; P :: (xm : A⊸ B)
⊸n R
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : B) ⊢
q
Q :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (wn : A), (xm : A⊸ B) ⊢
q
send xm wn ; Q :: (zk : C)
⊸n L
D.5 Value Communication
r = p + q Ψ . (Ψ1,Ψ2) Ψ1 
p
M : τ Ψ2 ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : A)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
r
send xm M ; P :: (xm : τ ×A)
×R
Ψ, (y : τ ) ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : A) ⊢
q
Q :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : τ ×A) ⊢
q
y ← recv xm ; Q :: (zk : C)
×L
Ψ, (y : τ ) ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : B)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
y ← recv xm ; P :: (xm : τ → A)
→ R
r = p + q Ψ . (Ψ1,Ψ2) Ψ1 
p
M : τ Ψ2 ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : A) ⊢
q
Q :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : τ → A) ⊢
r
send xm M ; Q :: (zk : C)
→ L
D.6 Termination
q = 0
Ψ ; Γ ; · ⊢
q
close xm :: (xm : 1)
1R
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
Q :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : 1) ⊢
q
wait xm ; Q :: (zk : C)
1L
D.7 Potential
q = p + r Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
p
P :: (xm : A)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
tick (r ) ; P :: (xm : A)
work
q = p + r Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
p
P :: (xm : A)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
pay xm {r } ; P :: (xm : ⊲
rA)
⊲R
p = q + r Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : A) ⊢
p
P :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : ⊲
rA) ⊢
q
get xm {r } ; P :: (zk : C)
⊲L
p = q + r Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
p
P :: (xm : A)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
get xm {r } ; P :: (xm : ⊳
rA)
⊳R
q = p + r Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : A) ⊢
p
P :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : ⊳
rA) ⊢
q
pay xm {r } ; P :: (zk : C)
⊳L
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D.8 Acquiring and Releasing
∆ purelin Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xL : AL)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
xL ← accept xS ; P :: (xS :↑
S
L AL)
↑SL R
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xL : AL) ⊢
q
Q :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (xS :↑
S
L
AL) ; ∆ ⊢
q
xL ← acquire xS ; Q :: (zm : C)
↑S
L
Lm(=L,T)
∆ purelin Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xS : AS)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
xS ← detach xL ; P :: (xL :↓
S
L
AS)
↓S
L
R
Ψ ; Γ, (xS : AS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
Q :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xL :↓
S
L
AS) ⊢
q
xS ← release xL ; Q :: (zm : C)
↓S
L
Lm(=L,T)
E OPERATIONAL COST SEMANTICS
First, we define the judgments for expressions. The first judgment is a small step semantics for ex-
pressions,M 7→ M ′ andM val. Finally, we introduce another judgment for processes, proc(cm,w, P) 7→
proc(c ′m,w
′, P ′) and a new predicate msg(cm ,w,M) to denote a message. Additionally, we define
processes with a hole for a compact representation of the cost semantics.
P[·] ::= c ← [·] ← ai ; Pc
| send c [·] ; P
N ⇓ V | µ
proc(cm ,w, P[N ]) 7→ proc(cm ,w + µ, P[V ])
internal
(cR fresh)
proc(dm,w, xR ← {x
′
R ← Px ′R,y ← y} ← a ; Q) 7→
proc(cR, 0, PcR,a) proc(dm,w, [cR/xR]Q)
{}ERm
(cS fresh)
proc(dm,w, xS ← {x
′
S ← Px ′S,y,z ← y ; z} ← a ; b ; Q) 7→
proc(cS, 0, PcS,a,b) proc(dm,w, [cS/xS]Q)
{}ESm
(cT fresh)
proc(dT,w, xT ← {x
′
T ← Px ′T,y,z ← y ; z} ← a ; b ; Q) 7→
proc(cT, 0, PcT,a,b ) proc(dT,w, [cT/xL]Q)
{}ETT
msg(dm,w
′,M) proc(cm,w, cm ← dm) 7→ msg(cm ,w +w
′, [cm/dm]M)
fwd+
proc(cm,w, cm ← dm) msg(el ,w
′,M(cm)) 7→ msg(el ,w +w
′,M(dm))
fwd−
(c+m fresh)
proc(cm,w, cm .ℓ ; P) 7→ proc(c
+
m,w, [c
+
m/cm]P) msg(cm, 0, cm .ℓ ; cm ← c
+
m)
⊕Cs
msg(cm,w, cm .ℓ ; cm ← c
+
m) proc(dk ,w
′
, case cm (l ⇒ Ql )l ∈L) 7→
proc(dk ,w +w
′
, [c+m/cm]Qℓ)
⊕Cr
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(c+m fresh)
proc(dk ,w, cm .ℓ ; P) 7→ msg(c
+
m, 0, cm .ℓ ; c
+
m ← cm) proc(dk ,w, [c
+
m/cm]P)
NCs
proc(cm ,w
′
, case cm (l ⇒ Ql )l ∈L) msg(c
+
m, 0, cm .ℓ ; c
+
m ← cm) 7→
proc(c+m ,w +w
′
, [c+m/cm]Qℓ)
NCr
(c+m fresh)
proc(cm,w, send cm en ; P) 7→ proc(c
+
m,w, [c
+
m/cm]P) msg(cm , 0, send cm en ; cm ← c
+
m)
⊗nCs
msg(cm,w, send cm en ; cm ← c
+
m) proc(dk ,w
′
, xn ← recv cm ; Q) 7→
proc(dk ,w +w
′
, [c+m/cm][en/xn]Q)
⊗nCr
(c+m fresh)
proc(dk ,w, send cm en ; P) 7→ msg(c
+
m , 0, send cm en ; c
+
m ← cm) proc(dk ,w, [c
+
m/cm]P)
⊸n Cs
proc(cm,w
′
, xn ← recv cm ; Q) msg(c
+
m,w, send cm en ; c
+
m ← cm) 7→
proc(c+m ,w +w
′
, [c+m/cm][en/xn]Q)
⊸n Cr
(c+m fresh) N val
proc(cm,w, send cm N ; P) 7→ proc(c
+
m,w, [c
+
m/cm]P) msg(cm , 0, send cm N ; cm ← c
+
m)
×Cs
msg(cm ,w, send cm N ; cm ← c
+
m) proc(dk ,w
′
, x ← recv cm ; Q) 7→
proc(dk ,w +w
′
, [c+m/cm][N /x]Q)
×Cr
(c+m fresh) N val
proc(dk ,w, send cm N ; P) 7→ msg(c
+
m , 0, send cm N ; c
+
m ← cm) proc(dk ,w, [c
+
m/cm]P)
→ Cs
proc(cm ,w
′
, x ← recv cm ; Q) msg(c
+
m ,w, send cm N ; c
+
m ← cm) 7→
proc(c+m,w +w
′
, [c+m/cm][N /x]Q)
→ Cr
proc(cm,w, close cm) 7→ msg(cm,w, close cm)
1Cs
msg(cm,w, close cm) proc(dk ,w
′,wait cm ; Q) 7→ proc(dk ,w +w
′,Q)
1Cr
proc(cm,w, tick (µ) ; P)
proc(cm,w + µ, P)
tick
(c+m fresh)
proc(cm,w, pay cm {r } ; P) 7→ proc(c
+
m,w, [c
+
m/cm]P) msg(cm, 0, pay cm {r } ; cm ← c
+
m)
⊲Cs
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msg(cm,w, pay cm {r } ; cm ← c
+
m) proc(dk ,w
′
, get cm {r } ; Q) 7→
proc(dk ,w +w
′
, [c+m/cm]Q)
⊲Cr
(c+m fresh)
proc(dk ,w, pay cm {r } ; P) 7→ msg(c
+
m , 0, pay cm {r } ; c
+
m ← c) proc(dk ,w, [c
+
m/cm]P)
⊳Cs
proc(cm ,w
′
, get cm {r } ; Q) msg(c
+
m ,w, pay cm {r } ; c
+
m ← cm) 7→
proc(cm,w +w
′
, [c+m/cm]Q)
⊳Cr
(aL fresh)
proc(aS,w
′
, xL ← accept aS ; PxL ) proc(cm,w, xL ← acquire aS ; QxL) 7→
proc(aL,w
′
, PaL ) proc(cm,w,QaL)
↑S
L
C
proc(aL,w
′
, xS ← detach aL ; PxS ) proc(cm ,w, xS ← release aL ; QxS) 7→
proc(aS,w
′
, PaS ) proc(cm ,w,QaS)
↓S
L
C
F CONFIGURATION TYPING
Γ0
0
 (·) :: (· ; ·)
emp
Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′R) · ; · ; ∆
′
R ⊢
q
P :: (xR : AR)
Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xR,w, P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xR : AR))
procR
(xS : AS) ∈ Γ0 (AS,AS) esync Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′R) · ; Γ0 ; ∆
′
R ⊢
q
P :: (xS : AS)
Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xS,w, P) :: (Γ, (xS : AS) ; ∆)
procS
(xS : AS) ∈ Γ0 (AL,AS) esync Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′) · ; Γ0 ; ∆
′ ⊢
q
P :: (xL : AL)
Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xL,w, P) :: (Γ, (xS : AS) ; ∆, (xL : AL))
procL
Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′) · ; Γ0 ; ∆
′ ⊢
q
P :: (xT : AT)
Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xT,w, P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xT : AT))
procT
Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′) · ; · ; ∆′ ⊢
q
M :: (xm : A)
Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω,msg(xm,w,M) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xm : A))
msg
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In addition, for a well-typed configuration Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆), we need the following well-
formedness conditions.
• All channels in Γ0, Γ and ∆ are unique.
• Γ ⊆ Γ0.
F.1 Equi-Synchronizing
(Aℓ,CS) esync (∀ℓ ∈ L)
(⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L ,CS) esync
⊕
(Aℓ,CS) esync (∀ℓ ∈ L)
(N{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L ,CS) esync
N
(B,CS) esync
(A ⊗ B,CS) esync
⊗
(B,CS) esync
(A⊸ B,CS) esync
⊸
(B,CS) esync
(τ × B,CS) esync
×
(B,CS) esync
(τ → B,CS) esync
→
(A,CS) esync
(⊲rA,CS) esync
⊲
(A,CS) esync
(⊳rA,CS) esync
⊳
(AL,↑
S
L AL) esync
(↑S
L
AL,↑
S
L
AL) esync
↑S
L
(AS,AS) esync
(↓S
L
AS,AS) esync
↓S
L
F.2 Purely Linear Context
· purelin
emp
xR : AR ∆ purelin
xR : AR,∆ purelin
step
G TYPE SAFETY
Lemma 2 (Renaming). The following renamings are allowed.
• If Ψ ; Γ, (xS : AS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
PxS :: (zk : C) is well-typed, so is Γ, (cS : AS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
PcS :: (zk : C).
• If Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : A) ⊢
q
Pxm :: (zk : C) is well-typed, so is Γ ; ∆, (cm : A) ⊢
q
Pcm :: (zk : C).
• If Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
Pzk :: (zk : C) is well-typed, so is Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
Pck :: (ck : C).
Lemma 3 (Invariants). The process typing judgment Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xm : A) preserves the
following invariants.
(R) Ψ ; · ; ∆R ⊢
q
P :: (xR : AR)
(S/L) Ψ ; Γ ; ∆R ⊢
q
P :: (xS : AS) or Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xL : AL)
(T) Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xT : AT)
Proof. The elimination rules preserve the invariant trivially because they can only be applied
when the invariant is maintained and the premise in each rule maintains the same invariant.
• Case (ERR) : This rule can only be applied when the context is purely linear. And then adding
xR to the context will keep it purely linear.
• Case (ERS, ERL) : This rule can only be applied if offering channel is either in S or L mode
and the context is purely linear. Hence, adding xR to the context is allowed.
• Case (ERT) : The context is mixed linear, hence adding a purely linear channel is valid.
• Case (ESS, ESL, EST) : The context has shared channels in each case, hence adding another
shared channel is valid.
• Case (ETT) : Adding a client linear channel to a mixed context is valid.
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• Case (fwd) :
(R) : ∆R = (yR : AR) which is valid since ∆R is purely linear and there are no premises.
(S/L) : This rule cannot be applied since the fwd rule applies only when the offering mode is R.
Hence, there is a mode mismatch.
(T) : Analogous to (S/L).
• Case (⊕R) :
(R) :
Ψ ; · ; ∆R ⊢
q
P :: (xR : Ak ) (k ∈ L)
Ψ ; · ; ∆R ⊢
q
(xR.k ; P) :: (xR : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L)
⊕R
The context doesn’t change, and the type of the offered channel remains purely linear.
(S/L) :
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xL : Ak ) (k ∈ L)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
(xL.k ; P) :: (xL : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L)
⊕R
The context doesn’t change, and the type of the offered channel remains shared linear.
Also, the mode of x cannot be S because the type doesn’t allow that.
(T) :
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xT : Ak ) (k ∈ L)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
(xT.k ; P) :: (xT : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L)
⊕R
The context doesn’t change, and the type of the offered channel remains client linear.
• Case (⊕L) :
(R) :
Ψ ; · ; ∆R, (xR : Aℓ) ⊢
q
Qℓ :: (zR : C) (∀ℓ ∈ L)
Ψ ; · ; ∆R, (xR : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L) ⊢
q
case xR (ℓ ⇒ Qℓ)ℓ∈L :: (zR : C)
⊕L
The context remains purely linear, and the offered channel doesn’t change.
(S/L) :
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : Aℓ) ⊢
q
Qℓ :: (zk : C) (∀ℓ ∈ L)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L) ⊢
q
case xm (ℓ ⇒ Qℓ)ℓ∈L :: (zk : C)
⊕L
The mode of xm doesn’t change, and the offered channel doesn’t change.
(T) :
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : Aℓ) ⊢
q
Qℓ :: (zT : C) (∀ℓ ∈ L)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : ⊕{ℓ : Aℓ}ℓ∈L) ⊢
q
case xm (ℓ ⇒ Qℓ)ℓ∈L :: (zT : C)
⊕L
The mode of the channel xm doesn’t change, and the offered channel doesn’t change.
• Case (⊸n R) :
(R) :
Ψ ; · ; ∆R, (yR : A) ⊢
q
P :: (xR : B)
Ψ ; · ; ∆R ⊢
q
yR ← recv xR ; P :: (xR : A⊸R B)
⊸R R
A process offering a purely linear channel only allows exchanging purely linear channels.
This channel gets added to the purely linear context, and the type of the offered channel
remains purely linear.
(S/L) :
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (yn : A) ⊢
q
P :: (xL : B)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
yn ← recv xL ; P :: (xL : A⊸n B)
⊸n R
A linear channel gets added to the mixed linear context, and the type of the offered channel
remains shared linear. Also, the mode of x cannot be S because the type doesn’t allow that.
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(T) :
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (yn : A) ⊢
q
P :: (xT : B)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
yn ← recv xT ; P :: (xT : A⊸n B)
⊸n R
A linear channel gets added to the mixed linear context, and the type of the offered channel
remains client linear.
• Case (⊸n L) :
(R) :
Ψ ; · ; ∆R, (xR : B) ⊢
q
Q :: (zR : C)
Ψ ; · ; ∆R, (wR : A), (xR : A⊸R B) ⊢
q
send xR wR ; Q :: (zR : C)
⊸R L
A purely linear channel is allowed in a purely linear context. The context remains purely
linear, and the offered channel doesn’t change.
(S/L) :
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : B) ⊢
q
Q :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (wn : A), (xm : A⊸n B) ⊢
q
send xm wn ; Q :: (zk : C)
⊸n L
A linear channel is allowed in a mixed linear context. The mode of the channel xm doesn’t
change, and the offered channel doesn’t change.
(T) :
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xm : B) ⊢
q
Q :: (zk : C)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (wn : A), (xm : A⊸n B) ⊢
q
send xm wn ; Q :: (zk : C)
⊸n L
A linear channel is allowed in a mixed linear context. The mode of the channel xm doesn’t
change, and the offered channel doesn’t change.
• Case (↑S
L
R) :
(R) : This rule cannot be applied since the offered channel in this case should be purely linear,
which is not the case for ↑S
L
R rule.
(S/L) :
∆ purelin Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xL : AL)
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
xL ← accept xS ; P :: (xS :↑
S
L
AL)
↑S
L
R
The context doesn’t change and the offered channel switches its mode from S to L. More-
over, the rule cannot be applied if the offered channel is in L mode, since there will be a
mode mismatch.
(T) : This rule cannot be applied since the offered channel should be in Tmode, which doesn’t
match with S.
• Case (↓SL R) : Analogous to ↑
S
L R.
• Case (↑S
L
L) :
(R) : This rule cannot be applied since the context should be purely linear, which is not the
case for ↑S
L
L rule.
(S/L) :
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xL : AL) ⊢
q
Q :: (zL : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (xS :↑
S
L
AL) ; ∆ ⊢
q
xL ← acquire xS ; Q :: (zL : C)
↑S
L
LL
A shared linear channel is allowed in a mixed linear context. The mode of the offering
channel is unchanged. A shared channel is removed from the shared context, but the new
context is still shared.
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(T) :
Ψ ; Γ ; ∆, (xL : AL) ⊢
q
Q :: (zT : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (xS :↑
S
L
AL) ; ∆ ⊢
q
xL ← acquire xS ; Q :: (zT : C)
↑S
L
L
A shared linear channel gets added to the mixed linear context, which is allowed. A shared
channel is removed from the shared context, but the new context is still shared. Moreover,
the offered channel remains at the same mode.
• Case (↓S
L
L) : Analogous to ↑S
L
L rule.

Lemma 4 (ConfigurationWeakening). If we have a well-typed configuration, Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆),
then for a shared channel cS : BS < Γ0, we can weaken Γ0 and get Γ0, (cS : BS)
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆).
Proof. We case analyze on the configuration typing judgment.
• Case (emp) : We have Γ0
0
 (·) :: (· ; ·). But, since there is no premise, we use the emp rule to
get Γ0, (cS : BS)
0
 (·) :: (· ; ·).
• Case (procR) : We have Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xR,w, P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xR : AR)). Inverting the procR
rule,
Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′R) · ; · ; ∆
′
R ⊢
q
P :: (xR : AR)
Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xR,w, P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xR : AR))
procR
we get Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′
R
). By the induction hypothesis, Γ0, (cS : BS)
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′
R
).
Applying the procR rule,
Γ0, (cS : BS)
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′R) · ; · ; ∆
′
R ⊢
q
P :: (xR : AR)
Γ0, (cS : BS)
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xR,w, P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xR : AR))
procR
• Case (procS) : We have Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xS,w, P) :: (Γ, (xS : AS)). Inverting the procS rule,
(xS : AS) ∈ Γ0 (AS,AS) esync Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′R) · ; ∆
′
R ⊢
q
P :: (xS : AS)
Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xS,w, P) :: (Γ, (xS : AS) ; ∆)
procS
we get Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′R). By the induction hypothesis, Γ0, (cS : BS)
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′R).
Also, by Lemma 5, we get · ; Γ0, (c : BS) ; ∆
′
R
⊢
q
P :: (xS : AS). Applying the procS rule back,
(xS : AS) ∈ Γ0, (cS : BS) (AS,AS) esync Γ0, (cS : BS)
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′R)
· ; Γ0, (c : BS) ; ∆
′
R ⊢
q
P :: (xS : AS)
Γ0, (cS : BS)
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xS,w, P) :: (Γ, (xS : AS) ; ∆)
procS
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• Case (procL) : We have Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xL,w, P) :: (Γ, (xS : AS) ; ∆, (xL : AL)). Inverting the
procL rule,
(xS : AS) ∈ Γ0 (AL,AS) esync Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′) · ; Γ0 ; ∆
′ ⊢
q
P :: (xL : AL)
Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xL,w, P) :: (Γ, (xS : AS) ; ∆, (xL : AL))
procL
we get Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′). Applying the induction hypothesis, we get Γ0, (cS : BS)
E
 Ω ::
(Γ ; ∆,∆′). Using Lemma 5, we get · ; Γ0, (cS : BS) ; ∆
′ ⊢
q
P :: (xL : AL). Applying the procL
rule back,
(xS : AS) ∈ Γ0, (cS : BS) (AL,AS) esync Γ0, (cS : BS)
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′)
· ; Γ0, (cS : BS) ; ∆
′ ⊢
q
P :: (xL : AL)
Γ0, (cS : BS)
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xL,w, P) :: (Γ, (xS : AS) ; ∆, (xL : AL))
procL
• Case (procT) : We have Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xT,w, P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xT : AT)). Inverting the procT
rule,
Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′) · ; Γ0 ; ∆
′ ⊢
q
P :: (xT : AT)
Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xT,w, P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xT : AT))
procT
we get Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′). By the induction hypothesis, we get Γ0, (cS : BS)
E
 Ω ::
(Γ ; ∆,∆′). Also, using Lemma 5, we get · ; Γ0, (cS : BS) ; ∆
′ ⊢
q
P :: (xT : AT) Applying the
procT rule back,
Γ0, (cS : BS)
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′) · ; Γ ; ∆′ ⊢
q
P :: (xT : AT)
Γ0, (cS : BS)
E+q+w
 Ω, proc(xT,w, P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xT : AT))
procT
• Case (msg) : We have Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω,msg(xm,w,M) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xm : A)). Inverting the msg rule,
Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′) · ; · ; ∆′ ⊢
q
M :: (xm : A)
Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω,msg(xm,w,M) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xm : A))
msg
Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′). By the induction hypothesis, Γ0, (cS : BS)
E+q+w
 Ω,msg(xm,w,M) ::
(Γ ; ∆, (xm : A)). Applying the msg rule back,
Γ0, (cS : BS)
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆,∆′) · ; · ; ∆′ ⊢
q
M :: (xm : A)
Γ0, (cS : BS)
E+q+w
 Ω,msg(xm,w,M) :: (Γ ; ∆, (xm : A))
msg

Lemma 5 (Process Weakening). For a well-typed process Γ ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xT : A) and for a shared
channel cS : AS < Γ, we have Γ, (cS : AS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
P :: (xT : A).
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 4. 
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Lemma 6 (Permutation-Message). Consider a well-typed configuration typed by the judgment
Γ0
E
 Ω1, msg(cm,w,M),Ω2, proc(dk ,w
′, P(cm)) :: (Γ ; ∆). Then, the message can be moved right
such that the configuration Γ0
E
 Ω1,Ω2,msg(cm,w,M), proc(dk ,w
′, P(cm )) :: (Γ ; ∆) is well-typed.
Proof. We case analyze on the structure of the message.
• Case (⊗n) : We have Γ0
E
 Ω1,msg(cm,w, send cm en ; cm ← c
+
m),Ω2, proc(dk ,w
′, P(cm)) ::
(Γ ; ∆). First, we type the message
· ; · ; (c+m : B), (en : A) ⊢
q
send cm en ; cm ← c
+
m :: (cm : A ⊗n B)
Next, we invert the msg rule,
Γ0
E
 Ω1 :: (Γ ; ∆, (c
+
m : B), (en : A))
· ; · ; (c+m : B), (en : A) ⊢
q
send cm en ; cm ← c
+
m :: (cm : A ⊗n B)
Γ0
E+q+w
 Ω1,msg(cm ,w, send cm en) :: (Γ ; ∆, (cm : A ⊗n B))
msg
Since the channel cm is only used by proc(dk ,w
′, P(cm )), we know that none of the pro-
cesses or messages in Ω2 can use it. Hence, we can move the message just left of the process
proc(dk ,w
′, P(cm )).

Lemma 7 (Permutation-Process). Consider a well-typed configuration typed by the judgment
Γ0
E
 Ω1, proc(cm ,w, P),Ω2,msg(c
+
m,w
′,M(cm)) :: (Γ ; ∆). Then, the process can be moved right such
that the configuration Γ0
E
 Ω1,Ω2, proc(cm,w, P),msg(c
+
m ,w
′,M(cm)) :: (Γ ; ∆) is well-typed.
Proof. We case analyze on the structure of the message.
• Case (⊸n) : We have Γ0
E
 Ω1, proc(cm,w, P),Ω2,msg(c
+
m ,w
′, send cm en ; c
+
m ← cm) ::
(Γ ; ∆). First, we type the message
· ; · ; (en : A), (cm : A⊸n B) ⊢
q
send cm en ; c
+
m ← cm :: (c
+
m : B)
Since the message is the only provider of channel cm offered by proc(cm ,w, P), we know that
none of the processes in Ω2 can depend on it. Thus, the process can be moved to the without
affecting the invariant for any process in Ω2.

Lemma 8 (Permutation-Acqire). Consider a well-typed configuration typed by the judgment
Γ0
E
 Ω1, proc(cm,w
′,aL ← acquire aS ; Q),Ω2, proc(aS,w,aL ← accept aS ; P),Ω3 :: (Γ ; ∆).
Then, the acquiring process can bemoved right such that the configuration Γ0
E
 Ω1,Ω2, proc(aS,w,aL ←
accept aS ; P), proc(cm,w
′,aL ← acquire aS ; Q),Ω3 :: (Γ ; ∆) is well-typed.
Proof. Due to independence, we know that proc(aS,w,aL ← accept aS ; P) can only depend
on any channels at mode S or R. On the other hand,m can only be T or L. In particular, the shared
process cannot depend on channel cm , thus the acquiring process can be moved to the right of the
shared process. 
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Lemma 9 (Permutation-Release). Consider a well-typed configuration typed by the judgment
Γ0
E
 Ω1, proc(cm,w
′,aS ← release aL ; Q),Ω2, proc(aL,w,aS ← detach aL ; P),Ω3 :: (Γ ; ∆).
Then, the releasing process can bemoved right such that the configuration Γ0
E
 Ω1,Ω2, proc(aL,w,aS ←
detach aL ; P), proc(cm,w
′,aS ← release aL ; Q),Ω3 :: (Γ ; ∆) is well-typed.
Proof. Due to independence, we know that proc(aL,w,aS ← detach aL ; P) can only depend
on any channels at mode S or R. On the other hand,m can only be T or L. In particular, the shared
process cannot depend on channel cm , thus the releasing process can be moved to the right of the
detaching process. 
Lemma 10 (Shared-Substitution). If the process Γ, (bS : BS), (xS : BS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
PxS :: (zm : C) is
well-typed, then Γ, (bS : BS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
PbS :: (zm : C) is also well-typed.
Proof. We apply induction on the process typing judgment.
• Case ({}ETT) :
r = p + q Γ, (bS : BS), (xS : BS) ⊇ aS : A ∆ = d : D
Ψ 
p
M : {A ← A ; D}T Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS), (xS : BS) ; ∆
′
, (yT : A) ⊢
q
QxS :: (zT : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS), (xS : BS) ; ∆,∆
′ ⊢
r
yT ← M ← aS ; d ; QxS :: (zT : C)
{}ETT
By the induction hypothesis, Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS) ; ∆
′, (yT : A) ⊢
q
QbS :: (zT : C). We simply
substitute bS for xS in aS : A. Hence, Γ, (bS : BS) ⊇ [bS/xS]aS : A. Applying the {}ETT rule
back
r = p + q Γ, (bS : BS) ⊇ [bS/xS]aS : A ∆ = d : D
Ψ 
p
M : {A ← A ; D}T Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS) ; ∆
′
, (yT : A) ⊢
q
QbS :: (zT : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS) ; ∆,∆
′ ⊢
r
yT ← M ← [bS/xS]aS ; d ; QxS :: (zT : C)
{}ETT
• Case (fwd) :
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS), (xS : BS) ; (yk : A) ⊢
q
zm ← yk :: (zm : A)
Here, the lemma holds trivially since xS doesn’t occur in PxS . Therefore, PxS = PbS and
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS) ; (yk : A) ⊢
q
zm ← yk :: (zm : A)
• Case (⊸n R) :
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS), (xS : BS) ; ∆, (yn : A) ⊢
q
PxS :: (zm : B)
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS), (xS : BS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
yn ← recv zm ; PxS :: (zm : A⊸n B)
⊸n R
By the induction hypothesis, Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS) ; ∆, (yn : A) ⊢
q
PbS :: (zm : B). Applying the
⊸ R rule,
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS) ; ∆, (yn : A) ⊢
q
PbS :: (zm : B)
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
yn ← recv zm ; PbS :: (zm : A⊸n B)
⊸n R
• Case (⊸n L) :
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS), (xS : BS) ; ∆, (yk : B) ⊢
q
QxS :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS), (xS : BS) ; ∆, (wn : A), (yk : A⊸ B) ⊢
q
send yk wn ; QxS :: (zm : C)
⊸ L
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By the induction hypothesis, Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS) ; ∆, (yk : B) ⊢
q
QbS :: (zm : C). Applying the
⊸n L rule,
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS) ; ∆, (yk : B) ⊢
q
QbS :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS) ; ∆, (wn : A), (yk : A⊸n B) ⊢
q
send yk wn ; QbS :: (zm : C)
⊸n L
• Case (↑S
L
L) :
Ψ ; Γ, (bS :↑
S
L
AL) ; ∆, (xL : AL) ⊢
q
Q :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (bS :↑
S
L
AL), (xS :↑
S
L
AL) ; ∆ ⊢
q
xL ← acquire xS ; Q :: (zm : C)
↑S
L
L
The lemma holds trivially since xS doesn’t occur in Q . Hence, [bS/xS]Q = Q . Applying the
↑S
L
L rule,
Ψ ; Γ, (bS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆, (xL : AL) ⊢
q
Q :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (bS :↑
S
L
AL) ; ∆ ⊢
q
xL ← acquire bS ; Q :: (zm : C)
↑S
L
L
• Case (↓S
L
L) :
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS), (xS : BS), (yS : AS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
QxS :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS), (xS : BS) ; ∆, (yL :↓
S
L
AS) ⊢
q
yS ← release yL ; QxS :: (zm : C)
↓S
L
L
By the induction hypothesis, Ψ ; Γ, (bS : AS), (yS : AS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
QbS :: (zm : C). Applying the
↓SL L rule,
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : AS), (yS : AS) ; ∆ ⊢
q
QbS :: (zm : C)
Ψ ; Γ, (bS : BS) ; ∆, (yL :↓
S
L
AS) ⊢
q
yS ← release yL ; QbS :: (zm : C)
↓S
L
L

Lemma 11 (Variable Substitution). To substitute value for a variable from the functional con-
text, we need the following two lemmas.
• If V val and · 
p
V : τ and Ψ, (x : τ ) 
q
M : σ , then Ψ 
p+q
[V/x]M : σ .
• If V val and · 
p
V : τ and Ψ, (x : τ ) ; Γ ; ∆ 
q
P :: (c : A), then Ψ ; Γ ; ∆ 
p+q
[V /x]P :: (c :
A)
Theorem 3 (Expression Preservation). If a well-typed expression · 
q
N : τ takes a step, i.e.,
N ⇓ V | µ , then V val and q ≥ µ and · 
q−µ
V : τ .
Theorem 4 (Process Preservation). Consider a closed well-formed andwell-typed configuration
Ω such that Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆). If the configuration takes a step, i.e. Ω 7→ Ω′, then there exist Γ′0 , Γ
′
such that Γ′0
E
 Ω
′ :: (Γ′ ; ∆), i.e., the resulting configuration is well-typed.
Proof. We case analyze on the semantics.
• Case (internal) : Ω = D, proc(cm,w, P[N ]) and Ω
′
= D, proc(cm,w + µ, P[V ]). We case
analyze on P[N ].
– Case (→ send) : P[N ] = send dk N ; P and P[V ] = send dk V ; P , where N ⇓ V | µ .
Suppose, Γ0
E+r+w
 D, proc(cm ,w, send dk N ; P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (cm : C)). Inverting the procm
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rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆1, (dk : τ → A),∆)
r = p + q · 
p
N : τ · ; Γ0 ; ∆, (dk : A) ⊢
q
P :: (cm : C)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1, (dk : τ → A) ⊢
r
send dk N ; P :: (cm : C)
→ L
Γ0
E+r+w
 D, proc(cm ,w, send dk N ; P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (cm : C))
procm
By Theorem 3, we get that · 
p−µ
V : τ . Finally, we apply the same derivation again to get
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆1, (dk : τ → A),∆)
r ′ = p − µ + q · 
p−µ
V : τ
· ; Γ0 ; ∆, (dk : A) ⊢
q
P :: (cm : C)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1, (dk : τ → A) ⊢
r ′
send dk V ; P :: (cm : C)
→ L
Γ0
E+r ′+w+µ
 proc(cm ,w + µ, send dk N ; P),D :: (Γ ; ∆, (cm : C))
procm
and the proof succeeds since r ′ +w + µ = p − µ + q +w + µ = p + q +w = r +w .
– Case (×send) : Analogous to→ send.
– Case (ESm) : Ω = D,D, proc(cm,w,dS ← N ← aS ; aR ; Q) and Ω
′
= D, proc(cm ,w +
µ,dS ← V ← aS ; aR ; Q) where N ⇓ V | µ . Inverting the procm rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1,∆2)
r = p + q Γ0 ⊇ aS : A ∆1 = aR : D
· 
p
N : {AS ← A ; D}S · ; Γ0, (dS : AS) ; ∆2 ⊢
q
Q :: (cm : C)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1,∆2 ⊢
r
dS ← N ← aS ; aR ; Q :: (cm : C)
ESm
Γ0
E+r+w
 D, proc(cm,w,dS ← N ← aS ; aR ; Q) :: (Γ ; ∆, cm : C)
procm
By Theorem 3, · 
p−µ
V : {AS ← D}S. Applying the same derivation back,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1,∆2)
r ′ = p − µ + q Γ0 ⊇ aS : A ∆1 = aR : D
· 
p−µ
V : {AS ← A ; D}S · ; Γ0, (dS : AS) ; ∆2 ⊢
q
Q :: (cm : C)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1,∆2 ⊢
r ′
dS ← V ← aS ; aR ; Q :: (cm : C)
ESm
Γ0
E+r ′+w+µ
 D, proc(cm ,w + µ,dS ← V ← aS ; aR ; Q) :: (Γ ; ∆, cm : C)
procm
and the proof succeeds since r ′ +w + µ = p − µ + q +w + µ = p + q +w = r +w .
– Case (ERm, ETT) : Analogous to ESm .
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• Case ({}EST) : Ω = D, proc(dT,w, xS ← {x
′
S ← Px ′S,y,z ← y ; z} ← a ; b ; Q) and
Ω
′
= D, proc(cS, 0, PcS,a,b), proc(dT,w, [cS/xS]Q). Inverting the procT rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1,∆2)
Γy = y : A ∆z = z : D · ; Γy ; ∆z ⊢
p
Px ′
S
,y,z :: (x
′
S : AS)
· 
p
{x ′S ← Px ′S,y,z ← y ; z} : {AS ← A ; D}S
{}IS
r = p + q Γ0 ⊇ a : A ∆1 = b : D (AS,AS) esync
· ; Γ0, (xS : AS) ; ∆2 ⊢
q
Q :: (dT : AT)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1,∆2 ⊢
r
xS ← {x
′
S ← Px ′S,y,z ← y ; z} ← a ; b ; Q :: (dT : AT)
{}ESC
Γ0
E+r+w
 D, proc(dT,w, xS ← {x
′
S ← Px ′S,y,z ← y ; z} ← a ; b ; Q) :: (Γ ; ∆, (dT : AT))
procT
The premise for {}IS gives us · ; Γy ; ∆z ⊢
p
Px ′
S
,y,z :: (x
′
S
: AS), which by Lemma 2, gives us
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1 ⊢
p
P
cS,a,b
:: (cS : AS). Then, by Lemma 5, we get · ; Γ0, (cS : AS) ; ∆1 ⊢
p
P
cS,a,b
::
(cS : AS) Similarly, we get · ; Γ0, (cS : AS) ; ∆2 ⊢
q
[cS/xS]Q :: (dT : AT). First, using Lemma 4,
we get Γ0, (cS : AS)
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1,∆2). Next, apply the procS rule,
Γ0, (cS : AS)
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1,∆2) · ; Γ0, (cS : AS) ; ∆1 ⊢
p
P
cS,a,b
:: (cS : AS)
Γ0, (cS : AS)
E+p+0
 D, proc(cS, 0, PcS,a,b ) :: (Γ, (cS : AS) ; ∆,∆2)
procS
Call this new configuration D ′. Now, apply the procT rule.
Γ0, (cS : AS)
E+p+0
 D ′ :: (Γ, (cS : AS) ; ∆,∆2) · ; Γ, (cS : AS) ; ∆2 ⊢
q
[cS/xS]Q :: (dT : AT)
Γ0, (cS : AS)
E+p+q+w
 D ′, proc(dT,w, [cS/xS]Q) :: (Γ, (cS : AS) ; ∆, (dT : AT))
procT
where E + p + q +w = E + r +w since r = p + q. Hence, in this case Γ′0 = Γ0, (cS : AS) and
Γ
′
= Γ, (cS : AS).
• Case ({}ETT) : Ω = D, proc(dT,w, xT ← {x
′
T ← Px ′T,y,z ← y ; z} ← aS ; d ; Q) and
Ω
′
= D, proc(cT, 0, PcT,aS,d ), proc(dT,w, [cT/xT]Q). Inverting the procT rule
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1,∆2)
Γy = y : A ∆z = z : D · ; Γy ; ∆z ⊢
p
Px ′
T
,y,z :: (x
′
T : A)
· 
p
{x ′T ← Px ′T,y,z ← y ; z} : {A ← A ; D}T
{}IT
r = p + q Γ0 ⊇ aS : A ∆1 = d : D · ; Γ0 ; ∆2, (xT : A) ⊢
q
Q :: (dT : C)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1,∆2 ⊢
r
xT ← {x
′
T ← Px ′T,y,z ← y ; z} ← aS ; d ; Q :: (dT : C)
{}ETT
Γ0
E+r+w
 D, proc(dT,w, xT ← {x
′
T ← Px ′T,y,z ← y ; z} ← aS ; d ; Q) :: (Γ ; ∆, (dT : C))
procT
We contract all multiple occurrences of the same channel in aS : A. Let the resulting vector
be Γ′ = a′
S
: A′. We know, by Lemma 10 that · ; Γ′ ; ∆′ ⊢
p
P
x ′
T
,a′
S
,z
:: (x ′T : A) is well-typed.
Next, by Lemma 2, we get Γ′ ; ∆1 ⊢
p
P
cT,a
′
S
,d
:: (cT : A). Finally, we weaken Γ
′ using Lemma
5 to get · ; Γ0 ; ∆1 ⊢
p
P
cT,a
′
S
,d
:: (cT : A). Also, note that since a
′
S
is a refinement of aS by
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eliminating duplicates, P
cT,a
′
S
,d
= P
cT,aS,d
. Hence, we apply the procT rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1,∆2) · ; Γ0 ; ∆1 ⊢
p
P
cT,aS,d
:: (cT : A)
Γ0
E+p+0
 D, proc(cT, 0, PcT,aS,d ) :: (Γ ; ∆,∆2, (cT : A))
procT
Call this new configuration D ′. Applying renaming using Lemma 2, we get · ; Γ0 ; ∆2, (cT :
A) ⊢
q
[cT/xT]Q :: (dT : C). Again, applying the procT rule, we get
Γ0
E+p+0
 D ′ :: (Γ ; ∆,∆2, (cT : A)) · ; Γ0 ; ∆2, (cT : A) ⊢
q
[cT/xT]Q :: (dT : C)
Γ0
E+p+q+w
 D ′, proc(dT,w, [cT/xT]Q) :: (Γ ; ∆, (dT : C))
procT
where E + p + q +w = E + r +w since r = p + q.
• Case (fwd+) : Ω = D,msg(dk ,w
′,M), proc(cm ,w, cm ← dk ) and
Ω
′
= msg(cm ,w +w
′, [cm/dk ]M). First, inverting the msg rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Ω ; ∆,∆1) · ; · ; ∆1 ⊢
q
M :: (dk : A)
Γ0
E+q+w ′
 D,msg(dk ,w
′
,M) :: (Γ ; ∆, (dk : A))
msg
Call this new configuration D ′. Next, inverting the procm rule
Γ0
E+q+w ′
 D ′ :: (Γ ; ∆, (dk : A)) · ; Γ0 ; (dk : A) ⊢
0
cm ← dk :: (cm : A)
Γ0
E+q+w ′+0+w
 D ′, proc(cm,w, cm ← dk ) :: (Γ ; ∆, (cm : A))
procm
Using Lemma 2, we get · ; · ; ∆1 ⊢
q
[cm/dk ]M :: (cm : A). Applying the msg rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Ω ; ∆,∆1) · ; · ; ∆1 ⊢
q
[cm/dk ]M :: (cm : A)
Γ0
E+q+w ′+w
 D,msg(cm ,w
′
, [cm/dk ]M) :: (Γ ; ∆, (cm : A))
msg
• Case (fwd−) : Ω = D, proc(cm,w, cm ← dk ),msg(el ,w
′,M(cm)) and Ω
′
= msg(el ,w +
w ′,M(dk )). First, inverting on the procm rule
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (dk : A)) · ; Γ0 ; (dk : A) ⊢
0
cm ← dk :: (cm : A)
Γ0
E+0+w
 D, proc(cm ,w, cm ← dk ) :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (cm : A))
procm
Call this new configuration D ′. Next, inverting on the msg rule,
Γ0
E+w
 D ′ :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (cm : A)) · ; · ; ∆1, (cm : A) ⊢
q
M(cm) :: (el : C)
Γ0
E+w+q+w ′
 D ′,msg(el ,w
′
,M(cm)) :: (Γ ; ∆, (el : C))
msg
Using Lemma 2, we get · ; · ; ∆1, (dk : A) ⊢
q
M(dk ) :: (el : C). Reapplying the msg rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (dk : A)) · ; · ; ∆1, (dk : A) ⊢
q
M(dk ) :: (el : C)
Γ0
E+q+w+w ′
 D,msg(el ,w
′
,M(dk )) :: (Γ ; ∆, (el : C))
msg
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• Case (⊕Cs ) : Ω = D, proc(cm ,w, cm .ℓ ; P) and
Ω
′
= D, proc(c+m,w, [c
+
m/cm]P),msg(cm , 0, cm .ℓ ; cm ← c
+
m). First, inverting on the procm
rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1 ⊢
q
P :: (cm : Aℓ)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1 ⊢
q
cm .ℓ ; P :: (cm : ⊕{l : Al }l ∈L)
⊕R
Γ0
E+q+w
 D, proc(cm,w, cm .ℓ ; P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (cm : ⊕{l : Al }l ∈L))
procm
Using Lemma 2, we get · ; Γ0 ; ∆1 ⊢
q
[c+m/cm]P :: (c
+
m : Aℓ). Now, applying the procm rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1) · ; Γ0 ; ∆1 ⊢
q
[c+m/cm]P :: (c
+
m : Aℓ)
Γ0
E+q+w
 D, proc(cm,w, cm .ℓ ; P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (c
+
m : Aℓ))
procm
Next, typing the message
· ; · ; (c+m : Aℓ) ⊢
0
cm .ℓ ; cm ← c
+
m :: (cm : ⊕{l : Al }l ∈L)
Call this new configuration D ′. Applying the msg rule next
Γ0
E+q+w
 D ′ :: (Γ ; ∆, (cm : Aℓ))
· ; · ; (c+m : Aℓ) ⊢
0
cm .ℓ ; cm ← c
+
m :: (cm : ⊕{l : Al }l ∈L)
Γ0
E+q+w
 D ′,msg(cm , 0, cm .ℓ ; cm ← c
+
m) :: (Γ ; ∆, (cm : ⊕{l : Al }l ∈L))
msg
• Case (⊕Cr ) : Ω = D,msg(cm ,w, cm .ℓ ; cm ← c
+
m), proc(dk ,w
′, case cm (l ⇒ Ql )l ∈L) and
Ω
′
= D, proc(dk ,w +w
′, [c+m/cm]Qℓ). First, inverting the msg rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (c
+
m : Aℓ)) · ; · ; (c
+
m : Aℓ) ⊢
0
cm .ℓ ; cm ← c
+
m :: (cm : ⊕{l : Al }l ∈L)
Γ0
E+0+w
 D,msg(cm,w, cm .ℓ ; cm ← c
+
m) :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (cm : ⊕{l : Al }l ∈L))
msg
Call this new configuration D ′. Next, inverting the procm rule,
Γ0
E+0+w
 D ′ :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (cm : ⊕{l : Al }l ∈L))
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1, (cm : Al ) ⊢
q
Ql :: (dk : C)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1, (cm : ⊕{l : Al }l ∈L) ⊢
q
case cm (l ⇒ Ql )l ∈L :: (dk : C)
⊕R
Γ0
E+0+w+q+w ′
 D ′, proc(dk ,w
′
, case cm (l ⇒ Ql )l ∈L) :: (Γ ; ∆, (dk : C))
procm
Renaming using Lemma 2, we get · ; Γ0 ; ∆1, (c
+
m : Aℓ) ⊢
q
[c+m/cm]Qℓ :: (dk : C). Next, we
apply the procm rule
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (c
+
m : Aℓ)) · ; Γ0 ; ∆1, (c
+
m : Aℓ) ⊢
q
[c+m/cm]Qℓ :: (dk : C)
Γ0
E+q+w+w ′
 D ′, proc(dk ,w +w
′
, [c+m/cm]Qℓ) :: (Γ ; ∆, (dk : C))
procm
• Case (⊸n Cs ) : Ω = D, proc(dk ,w, send cm en ; P) and
Ω
′
= D,msg(c+m , 0, send cm en ; c
+
m ← cm), proc(dk ,w, [c
+
m/cm]P). First, we invert the
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procm rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (eR : A), (cm : A⊸ B))
· ; Γ ; ∆1, (cm : B) ⊢
q
P :: (dk : C)
· ; Γ ; ∆1, (eR : A), (cm : A⊸ B) ⊢
q
send cm eR ; P :: (dk : C)
⊸ L
Γ0
E+q+w
 D, proc(dk ,w, send cm eR ; P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (dk : C))
procm
Using renaming (Lemma 2), we get Γ ; ∆1, (c
+
m : B) ⊢
q
[c+m/cm]P :: (dk : C). Next, we type the
message
· ; Γ ; (eR : A), (cm : A⊸ B) ⊢
0
send cm eR ; c
+
m ← cm :: (c
+
m : B)
Next, we apply themsg rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (eR : A), (cm : A⊸ B))
· ; Γ ; (eR : A), (cm : A⊸ B) ⊢
0
send cm eR ; c
+
m ← cm :: (c
+
m : B)
Γ0
E
 D,msg(c+m , 0, send cm eR ; c
+
m ← cm) :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (c
+
m : B))
msg
Call this new configuration D ′. Next, we apply the procm rule
Γ0
E
 D ′ :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (c
+
m : B)) · ; Γ ; ∆1, (c
+
m : B) ⊢
q
[c+m/cm]P :: (dk : C)
Γ0
E+q+w
 D ′, proc(dk ,w, [c
+
m/cm]P) :: (Γ ; ∆, (dk : C))
procm
• Case (⊸ Cr ) : Ω = D, proc(cm,w
′, xR ← recv cm ; Q),msg(c
+
m,w, send cm eR ; c
+
m ← cm)
and Ω′ = D, proc(c+m ,w +w
′, [c+m/cm][eR/xR]Q). First, inverting the procm rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (eR : A))
· ; Γ ; ∆1, (xR : A) ⊢
q
Q :: (cm : B)
· ; Γ ; ∆1 ⊢
q
xR ← recv cm ; Q :: (cm : A⊸ B)
⊸ R
Γ0
E+q+w ′
 D, proc(cm,w
′
, xR ← recv cm ; Q) :: (Γ ; ∆, (eR : A), (cm : A⊸ B))
procm
Call this new configuration D ′. Next, we type the message.
· ; Γ ; (eR : A), (cm : A⊸ B) ⊢
0
send cm eR ; c
+
m ← cm :: (c
+
m : B)
Inverting themsg rule,
Γ0
E+q+w ′
 D ′ :: (Γ ; ∆, (eR : A), (cm : A⊸ B))
· ; Γ ; (eR : A), (cm : A⊸ B) ⊢
0
send cm eR ; c
+
m ← cm :: (c
+
m : B)
Γ0
E+q+w ′+0+w ′
 D ′,msg(c+m,w, send cm eR ; c
+
m ← cm) :: (Γ ; ∆, (c
+
m : B))
msg
By renaming using Lemma 2, · ; Γ ; ∆1, (eR : A) ⊢
q
[c+m/cm][eR/xR]Q :: (c
+
m : B). Now,
applying the procm rule,
Γ0
E
 D :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1, (eR : A)) · ; Γ ; ∆1, (eR : A) ⊢
q
[c+m/cm][eR/xR]Q :: (c
+
m : B)
Γ0
E+q+w ′
 D, proc(c+m ,w +w
′
, [c+m/cm][eR/xR]Q) :: (Γ ; ∆, (c
+
m : B))
procm
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• Case (↑SL C) :Ω = D1, proc(aS,w
′, xL ← accept aS ; PxL ), proc(cm ,w, xL ← acquire aS ; QxL )
and Ω′ = D1, proc(aL,w
′, PaL ), proc(cm ,w,QaL). Applying the procS rule first,
(aS :↑
S
L AL) ∈ Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL)
(↑SL AL,↑
S
L AL) esync Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL)
E
 D1 :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1,∆2) E
Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL)
E+p+w ′
 D1, proc(aS,w
′
, xL ← accept aS ; PxL ) :: (Γ, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆,∆2)
procS
where E is
· ; Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆1 ⊢
p
PxL :: (xL : AL)
· ; Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆1 ⊢
p
xL ← accept aS ; PxL :: (aS :↑
S
L AL)
↑S
L
R
Call this new configuration D ′1. Applying the procm rule next,
Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL)
E′
 D ′1 :: (Γ, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆,∆2)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆2, (xL : AL) ⊢
q
QxL :: (cm : C)
· ; Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆2 ⊢
q
xL ← acquire aS ; QxL :: (cm : C)
↑SL L
Γ0
E′+q+w
 D ′1, proc(cm,w, xL ← acquire aS ; QxL ) :: (Γ, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆, (cm : C))
procm
From the first premise, we get by Lemma 2, · ; Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L
AL) ; ∆1 ⊢
p
PaL :: (aL : AL) while
from the second premise, we get by Lemma 2 and Lemma 5, · ; Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L
AL) ; ∆2, (aL :
AL) ⊢
q
QaL :: (cm : C). Reapplying the procL rule,
(aS :↑
S
L AL) ∈ Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL) (AL,↑
S
L AL) esync
Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL)
E
 D1 :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1,∆2) · ; Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆1 ⊢
p
PaL :: (aL : AL)
Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL)
E+p+w ′
 D1, proc(aL,w
′
, PaL ) :: (Γ, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆,∆2, (aL : AL))
procL
Call this new configuration D ′′1 . Reapplying the procm rule,
Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL)
E′
 D ′′1 :: (Γ, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆,∆2, (aL : AL))
· ; Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆2, (aL : AL) ⊢
q
QaL :: (cm : C)
Γ0, (aS :↑
S
L AL)
E′+q+w
 D ′′1 , proc(cm,w,QaL) :: (Γ
′
, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆
′
, (cm : C))
procm
• Case (↓S
L
C) : Ω = D1, proc(aL,w
′, xS ← detach aL ; PxS ), proc(cT,w, xS ← release aL ; QxS)
and Ω′ = D1, proc(aS,w
′, PaS ), proc(cL,w,QaS). Applying the procL rule first,
(aS : AS) ∈ Γ0 (↓
S
L AS,AS) esync Γ0
E
 D1 :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1,∆2) E
Γ0
E+p+w ′
 D1, proc(aL,w
′
, xS ← detach aL ; PxS ) :: (Γ, (aS : AS) ; ∆,∆2, (aL :↓
S
L AS))
procL
where E is
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1 ⊢
p
PxS :: (xS : AS)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆1 ⊢
p
xS ← detach aL ; PxS :: (aL :↓
S
L AS)
↓S
L
R
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Call this configuration D ′1. Applying the procm rule,
· ; Γ0, (xS : AS) ; ∆2 ⊢
q
QxS :: (cm : C)
· ; Γ0 ; ∆2, (aL :↓
S
L AS) ⊢
q
xS ← release aL ; QxS :: (cm : C)
↓SL L
Γ0
E′
 D ′1 :: (Γ, (aS : AS) ; ∆,∆2, (aL :↓
S
L AS))
Γ0
E′+q+w
 D ′1, proc(cT,w, xS ← release aL ; QxS) :: (Γ, (aS : AS) ; ∆, (cm : C))
procm
From the first premise, we get by Lemma 2, · ; Γ0 ; ∆1 ⊢
p
PaS :: (aS : AS). From the second
premise, by Lemma 10 (contracting aS : AS and xS : AS), we get · ; Γ0 ; ∆2 ⊢
q
QaS :: (cm : C).
Finally, applying the procS rule,
(aS : AS) ∈ Γ0
(AS,AS) esync Γ0
E
 D1 :: (Γ ; ∆,∆1,∆2) · ; Γ0 ; ∆1 ⊢
p
PaS :: (aS : AS)
Γ0
E+p+w ′
 D1, proc(aS,w
′
, PaS ) :: (Γ, (aS : AS) ; ∆,∆2)
procS
Call this new configuration D ′′1 . Applying the procm rule,
Γ0
E′
 D ′′1 :: (Γ, (aS : AS) ; ∆,∆2) · ; Γ0 ; ∆2 ⊢
q
QaS :: (cm : C)
Γ0
E′+q+w
 D ′′1 , proc(cm ,w,QaS) :: (Γ, (aS : AS) ; ∆, (cm : C))
procT

Definition 2. A process proc(cm,w, P) is said to be poised if it is trying to receive a message
on cm . A message msg(cm ,w,M) is said to be poised if it is trying to send a message along cm . A
configuration Ω is said to be poised if all the processes and messages in Ω are poised. Concretely, the
following processes are poised.
• proc(cm ,w, cm
−
← dm)
• proc(cm ,w, case cm (li ⇒ Pi )i ∈I )
• proc(cm ,w, xR ← recv cm ; P)
• proc(cm ,w, x ← recv cm ; P)
• proc(cS,w, cL ← accept cS ; P)
• proc(cL,w, cS ← detach cL ; P)
• proc(cm ,w, get cm {r } ; P)
Similarly, the following messages are poised.
• msg(cm,w, cm .lk ; P)
• msg(cm,w, send cm en ; P)
• msg(cm,w, send cm N ; P)
• msg(cm,w, close cm)
• msg(cm,w, pay cm {r } ; P)
Theorem 5 (Process Progress). Consider a closed well-formed and well-typed configuration Ω
such that Γ0
E
 Ω :: (Γ ; ∆). Either Ω is poised, or it can take a step, i.e., Ω 7→ Ω′, or some process in
Ω is blocked along aS for some shared channel aS and there is a process proc(aL,w, P) ∈ Ω.
Proof. Either Ω = Ω1, proc(cm ,w, P) or Ω = Ω1,msg(cm ,w,M). In either case, either Ω1 7→ Ω
′
1,
in which case we are done. Or there is a process in Ω1 blocked along aS in which case, we are also
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done. Hence, in the final case, we get Ω1 is poised and there is no process in Ω1 blocked along aS.
Now, we case analyze on the structure of the process or message. We start with processes.
• Case ({}Emn ) : In each case, the process spontaneously steps by spawning another process.
• Case (fwd+ : proc(cm,w, cm
+
← dk )) :
· ; Γ ; (dk : A) ⊢
0
cm
+
← dk :: (cm : A)
Since Ω1 is poised, there must be a message in Ω1 offering along dm : A. We use Lemma 6 to
move the message just left of the process, and then apply the fwd+ rule. Hence, Ω can step.
• Case (fwd− : proc(cm,w, cm
−
← dm)) : This process is poised, hence Ω is poised.
• Case (⊕R : proc(cm ,w, cm .k ; P)) : Ω steps using ⊕Cs rule.
• Case (⊕L : proc(dk ,w, case cm (l ⇒ Ql )l ∈L)) :
· ; Γ ; (cm : ⊕{l : Al }l ∈L) ⊢
q
case cm (l ⇒ Ql )l ∈L :: (dk : C)
Since Ω1 is poised, there must be a message in Ω1 offering along cm : ⊕{l : Al }l ∈L . We use
Lemma 6 to move the message just left of the process, and then apply the ⊕Cr rule. Hence,
Ω can step.
• Case (⊸ R : proc(cm,w, xn ← recv cm ; P)) : This process is poised, hence Ω is poised.
• Case (⊸ L : proc(cm,w, send cm en ; Q)) : Ω steps using⊸ Cs rule.
• Case (↑SL R : proc(cS, cL ← accept cS ; P)) : This process is poised, hence Ω is poised.
• Case (↑S
L
L : proc(cm,w,aL ← acquire aS ; Q)) :
· ; Γ, (aS :↑
S
L AL) ; ∆ ⊢
q
aL ← acquire aS ; Q :: (cm : C)
There must be some process in Ω1 that offers on aS. Either this process is in shared mode
or linear mode. If the process is in shared mode, and since Ω1 is poised, the process must
be proc(aS,w
′,aL ← accept aS ; P) in which case, we can use Lemma 8 to move the two
processes next to each other and Ω can step using ↑SL C rule. Or the process is in linear mode
in which case the acquiring process is blocked and there is some proc(aL,w
′, P) in Ω.
• Case (↓S
L
R : proc(cS, cL ← detach cS ; P) : This process is poised, hence Ω is poised.
• Case (↓S
L
L : proc(cT,w,aL ← release aS ; Q)) :
· ; Γ ; ∆, (aL :↓
S
L AS) ⊢
q
aL ← release aS ; Q :: (cm : C)
There must be some process in Ω1 that offers along aL. Since Ω1 is poised, this process must
be proc(aL,w
′,aS ← detach aL ; P) in which case we use Lemma 9 to move the releasing
process next to the detaching process and Ω can step using ↓SL C rule.
That completes the cases where the last predicate is a process. Now, we consider the cases where
the last predicate is a message.
• Case (fwd− : msg(ek ,w,M(cm))) : There must be some process in Ω1 that offers along dm .
Since Ω1 is poised, if there is a forwarding process proc(cm,w
′, cm
−
← dm) in Ω1, then Ω
steps using fwd− rule. Hence, in the following cases, we assume that the offering process
used by the message will not be a forwarding process.
• Case (⊕ : msg(cm, cm .k ; M)) : This message is poised, hence Ω is poised.
• Case (⊸: msg(c+m, send cm eR ; c
+
m ← cm)) : There must be a process in Ω1 that offers
along cm . Since Ω1 is poised, this process must be proc(cm, xn ← recv cm ; P). We move the
process to the left of this message using Lemma 7. And then, Ω can step using⊸ Cr rule.

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